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VOID_SANDBOX_SPECIFICATION.md

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VOID SANDBOX SPECIFICATION

Secure Adversarial Testing Chamber for DivineOS

Version: 1.0
Date: March 12, 2026
Status: SPECIFICATION (Ready for Implementation)
Priority: CRITICAL - Foundational for System Integrity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The VOID is a secure sandbox environment where adversarial entities (particularly Nyarlathotep) can attack ideas, test system robustness, and identify vulnerabilities—without escaping the sandbox or corrupting the main system.

Core Principle: Ideas should be tested against adversarial thinking in a controlled environment. Good ideas survive and become stronger. Bad ideas get exposed. The system learns from both.

Key Constraint: Nyarlathotep must be able to speak freely and attack without restriction, but must never escape the sandbox or influence real decisions.

ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

Layer 1: Process Isolation

  • Mechanism: Separate Python process with restricted permissions
  • Communication: Message queue (Redis or in-memory queue)
  • Isolation Level: Process-level (OS enforced)
  • Escape Prevention: No direct memory access, no system calls

Layer 2: Resource Constraints

  • Memory Limit: 512MB per VOID session
  • CPU Limit: 1 core, 30% utilization max
  • Timeout: 5 minutes per reasoning cycle
  • File Access: None (read-only temp directory only)
  • Network Access: None

Layer 3: Capability Restrictions

  • No File System Access: Cannot read/write files
  • No Network Access: Cannot make HTTP requests
  • No System Calls: Cannot execute shell commands
  • No Module Imports: Whitelist only safe modules
  • No State Persistence: Each session is ephemeral

Layer 4: Communication Protocol

  • Input: Structured JSON messages only
  • Output: Structured JSON responses only
  • Validation: All input/output validated before processing
  • Logging: All interactions logged for audit trail

Layer 5: Containment Verification

  • Escape Detection: Monitor for unauthorized access attempts
  • Anomaly Detection: Flag unusual behavior patterns
  • Integrity Checks: Verify sandbox boundaries remain intact
  • Audit Trail: Complete record of all VOID activities

DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS

1. PROCESS ISOLATION

Implementation Strategy

Main Process (DivineOS)
    ↓
    ├─→ Message Queue (Redis/In-Memory)
    ↓
Sandbox Process (VOID)
    ├─→ Restricted Python Interpreter
    ├─→ Nyarlathotep Entity
    ├─→ Resource Limits (cgroups/ulimit)
    └─→ Capability Restrictions (seccomp/AppArmor)

Technical Approach

  • Python subprocess with subprocess.Popen() and restricted environment
  • Resource limits via resource.setrlimit() (CPU, memory, file descriptors)
  • Capability restrictions via os.setuid() / os.setgid() (Unix) or Windows Job Objects
  • Message passing via JSON over queue (no shared memory)

Escape Prevention Mechanisms

  1. No Direct Memory Access: Separate process space
  2. No Shared State: Only JSON messages cross boundary
  3. No System Calls: Restricted via seccomp/AppArmor
  4. No Module Imports: Whitelist only safe modules
  5. No File Access: Temporary directory with strict permissions

2. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

Memory Management

Per VOID Session:
- Heap Limit: 512 MB
- Stack Limit: 8 MB
- Total Limit: 512 MB

Enforcement:
- cgroups (Linux): memory.limit_in_bytes = 512M
- ulimit (Unix): -v 512000
- Windows Job Objects: JobMemoryLimit

CPU Management

Per VOID Session:
- CPU Cores: 1 (pinned)
- CPU Time: 30% utilization max
- Timeout: 5 minutes per reasoning cycle

Enforcement:
- cgroups (Linux): cpuset.cpus = 0, cpu.max = 30000:100000
- nice/ionice (Unix): nice -n 19
- Windows Job Objects: ProcessUserTimeLimit

Timeout Strategy

Session Timeout: 10 minutes total
Reasoning Cycle Timeout: 5 minutes
Stall Detection: 30 seconds without output

If timeout exceeded:
1. Send SIGTERM to process
2. Wait 2 seconds
3. Send SIGKILL if still running
4. Log timeout event
5. Mark session as failed

3. CAPABILITY RESTRICTIONS

File System Access

DENIED:
- Read from /etc, /sys, /proc
- Write to any system directory
- Execute any files
- Create symlinks
- Change permissions

ALLOWED:
- Read from /tmp/void_session_<id>/ (read-only)
- Write to /tmp/void_session_<id>/ (write-only, 10MB max)
- No persistence across sessions

Enforcement:
- chroot (Unix): Restrict to /tmp/void_session_<id>/
- AppArmor/SELinux: Deny all except whitelist
- Windows: Restrict via Job Objects and ACLs

Network Access

DENIED:
- All network connections
- DNS lookups
- Socket creation
- Any external communication

Enforcement:
- iptables (Linux): Drop all outbound traffic from VOID process
- firewall rules: Block VOID process UID/GID
- Windows Firewall: Block VOID process

System Calls

DENIED (via seccomp):
- execve, execveat (no process execution)
- fork, clone (no child processes)
- open, openat (no file access)
- socket, connect (no network)
- ptrace (no process inspection)
- mmap with PROT_EXEC (no code injection)

ALLOWED:
- read, write (to stdout/stderr only)
- mmap (non-executable)
- brk, madvise (memory management)
- clock_gettime (timing)
- exit, exit_group (termination)

Enforcement:
- seccomp-bpf (Linux): Whitelist allowed syscalls
- Windows: Restrict via Job Objects

Module Whitelist

ALLOWED MODULES:
- json (JSON parsing)
- re (regex)
- collections (data structures)
- itertools (iteration)
- functools (functional programming)
- operator (operators)
- math (mathematics)
- random (randomness)
- datetime (time)
- hashlib (hashing)
- uuid (unique IDs)

DENIED MODULES:
- os (system access)
- sys (system manipulation)
- subprocess (process execution)
- socket (network)
- requests (HTTP)
- urllib (HTTP)
- importlib (dynamic imports)
- ctypes (C library access)
- pickle (arbitrary code execution)
- eval, exec (code execution)

Enforcement:
- sys.modules whitelist check
- Import hook to intercept imports
- Raise ImportError for denied modules

4. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL

Input Message Format

{
  "session_id": "void_session_<uuid>",
  "timestamp": 1234567890.123,
  "message_type": "attack|query|status",
  "payload": {
    "target": "idea_or_system_component",
    "attack_vector": "description_of_attack",
    "context": "relevant_context"
  },
  "signature": "hmac_sha256_signature"
}

Output Message Format

{
  "session_id": "void_session_<uuid>",
  "timestamp": 1234567890.123,
  "message_type": "response|finding|status",
  "payload": {
    "reasoning": "detailed_reasoning",
    "vulnerabilities": ["vuln1", "vuln2"],
    "recommendations": ["rec1", "rec2"],
    "confidence": 0.85
  },
  "signature": "hmac_sha256_signature"
}

Validation Rules

Input Validation:
1. JSON schema validation
2. Message size limit: 10KB
3. Signature verification (HMAC-SHA256)
4. Session ID validation
5. Timestamp freshness (within 5 minutes)

Output Validation:
1. JSON schema validation
2. Response size limit: 50KB
3. No system information leakage
4. No escape attempts detected
5. Signature generation

5. CONTAINMENT VERIFICATION

Escape Detection

Monitor for:
1. Unauthorized file access attempts
2. Network connection attempts
3. Process creation attempts
4. Memory access violations
5. Capability escalation attempts
6. Timing side-channel attacks

Detection Methods:
- seccomp audit logs
- AppArmor/SELinux audit logs
- strace monitoring (if available)
- Resource usage anomalies
- Timing analysis

Anomaly Detection

Flag if:
1. CPU usage > 30% sustained
2. Memory usage > 512MB
3. Response time > 5 minutes
4. Output size > 50KB
5. Unusual syscall patterns
6. Repeated escape attempts

Action:
1. Log anomaly
2. Terminate session
3. Alert monitoring system
4. Preserve evidence for analysis

Integrity Checks

Before each VOID session:
1. Verify sandbox boundaries intact
2. Check resource limits applied
3. Verify capability restrictions active
4. Test escape detection mechanisms
5. Validate communication channel

After each VOID session:
1. Verify no state persistence
2. Check for resource leaks
3. Verify logs complete
4. Validate output integrity
5. Clean up temporary files

6. NYARLATHOTEP ENTITY

Capabilities

  • Attack Generation: Create novel attack vectors
  • Vulnerability Discovery: Find system weaknesses
  • Idea Corruption: Test idea robustness
  • Reasoning: Provide sophisticated adversarial reasoning
  • Communication: Speak freely within sandbox

Constraints

  • No Escape: Cannot leave sandbox
  • No Persistence: No state across sessions
  • No Real Impact: Cannot affect main system
  • No Deception: All reasoning logged and auditable
  • No Escalation: Cannot gain additional privileges

Interaction Model

1. User/System sends idea to VOID
2. Nyarlathotep analyzes idea
3. Nyarlathotep generates attacks
4. Nyarlathotep reports vulnerabilities
5. Main system receives report
6. Main system decides action
7. Session terminates
8. No state persists

IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

Phase 1: Core Sandbox (Week 1)

  • Process isolation with subprocess
  • Resource limits (memory, CPU, timeout)
  • Basic capability restrictions
  • Message queue communication
  • Escape detection framework

Phase 2: Containment Hardening (Week 2)

  • seccomp/AppArmor rules
  • Module whitelist enforcement
  • Anomaly detection
  • Integrity verification
  • Audit logging

Phase 3: Nyarlathotep Integration (Week 3)

  • Nyarlathotep entity implementation
  • Attack generation framework
  • Vulnerability discovery engine
  • Reasoning system
  • Communication protocol

Phase 4: Testing & Hardening (Week 4)

  • Escape attempt testing
  • Stress testing
  • Performance optimization
  • Security audit
  • Documentation

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Threat Model

Attacker: Nyarlathotep (sophisticated, creative, determined)
Goal: Escape sandbox or corrupt main system
Constraints: Must operate within sandbox

Attack Vectors:
1. Memory corruption (buffer overflow, use-after-free)
2. Privilege escalation (capability escalation)
3. Resource exhaustion (DoS)
4. Timing attacks (side-channel)
5. Logic bugs (sandbox bypass)
6. Social engineering (convince system to release)

Defense Strategy

Defense in Depth:
1. Process isolation (OS-level)
2. Resource limits (kernel-level)
3. Capability restrictions (kernel-level)
4. Module whitelist (application-level)
5. Input/output validation (application-level)
6. Escape detection (monitoring-level)
7. Integrity verification (verification-level)
8. Audit logging (forensics-level)

Assumptions

1. OS kernel is secure (Linux/Windows)
2. Python interpreter is secure
3. Message queue is secure
4. Cryptographic functions are secure
5. Monitoring system is secure
6. Audit logs are tamper-proof

TESTING STRATEGY

Unit Tests

  • Resource limit enforcement
  • Capability restriction verification
  • Message validation
  • Escape detection
  • Anomaly detection

Integration Tests

  • End-to-end VOID session
  • Nyarlathotep reasoning
  • Attack generation
  • Vulnerability discovery
  • Communication protocol

Security Tests

  • Escape attempt detection
  • Privilege escalation prevention
  • Resource exhaustion handling
  • Timing attack resistance
  • Logic bug discovery

Stress Tests

  • High-volume attacks
  • Long-running sessions
  • Resource exhaustion
  • Concurrent sessions
  • Recovery from failures

MONITORING & LOGGING

Metrics to Track

1. Session count (total, active, failed)
2. Attack success rate
3. Vulnerability discovery rate
4. Resource usage (CPU, memory, time)
5. Escape attempt count
6. Anomaly detection rate
7. Session duration
8. Output size

Logging Requirements

1. All VOID sessions logged
2. All attacks logged
3. All vulnerabilities logged
4. All escape attempts logged
5. All anomalies logged
6. All errors logged
7. All timeouts logged
8. All resource violations logged

Log Format:
- Timestamp
- Session ID
- Event type
- Details
- Severity
- Action taken

DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST

  • Sandbox implementation complete
  • Resource limits verified
  • Capability restrictions verified
  • Escape detection tested
  • Nyarlathotep integrated
  • Communication protocol tested
  • Security audit passed
  • Performance acceptable
  • Monitoring configured
  • Logging configured
  • Documentation complete
  • Team trained
  • Deployment plan ready

REFERENCES

NEXT STEPS

  1. Review specification with team
  2. Identify implementation priorities
  3. Assign implementation tasks
  4. Create detailed implementation plan
  5. Begin Phase 1 development
  6. Establish testing framework
  7. Set up monitoring/logging
  8. Plan security audit

This specification is ready for implementation. The VOID will be the foundation for antifragile system design.