Merge pull request #10826 from mimi89999/trng_rp2350

Use TRNG as additional entropy source on RP2350

Author: tannewt

ports/raspberrypi/common-hal/os/__init__.c

@@ -18,35 +18,159 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
+#ifdef HAS_RP2350_TRNG
+#include "hardware/structs/trng.h"
+#include "hardware/sync.h"
+#endif
+
 // NIST Special Publication 800-90B (draft) recommends several extractors,
 // including the SHA hash family and states that if the amount of entropy input
 // is twice the number of bits output from them, that output can be considered
-// essentially fully random.  If every RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN bits from
-// `rosc_hw->randombit` have at least 1 bit of entropy, then this criterion is met.
+// essentially fully random.
+//
+// This works by seeding `random_state` with entropy from hardware sources
+// (SHA-256 as the conditioning function), then using that state as a counter
+// input (SHA-256 as a CSPRNG), re-seeding at least every 256 blocks (8kB).
 //
-// This works by seeding the `random_state` with plenty of random bits (SHA256
-// as entropy harvesting function), then using that state it as a counter input
-// (SHA256 as a CSPRNG), re-seeding at least every 256 blocks (8kB).
+// On RP2350, entropy comes from both the dedicated TRNG peripheral and the
+// ROSC. On RP2040, the ROSC is the only available source.
 //
 // In practice, `PractRand` doesn't detect any gross problems with the output
 // random numbers on samples of 1 to 8 megabytes, no matter the setting of
-// RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN.  (it does detect "unusual" results from time to time,
+// ROSC_SAFETY_MARGIN.  (it does detect "unusual" results from time to time,
 // as it will with any RNG)
-#define RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN (4)
+
+// Number of ROSC collection rounds on RP2040. Each round feeds
+// SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE bytes into the hash; we do 2*N rounds so the
+// raw-to-output ratio satisfies 800-90B's 2:1 minimum.
+#define ROSC_SAFETY_MARGIN (4)
 
 static BYTE random_state[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+// Collect `count` bytes from the ROSC, one bit per read.
+static void rosc_random_bytes(BYTE *buf, size_t count) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+        buf[i] = rosc_hw->randombit & 1;
+        for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
+            buf[i] = (buf[i] << 1) ^ (rosc_hw->randombit & 1);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HAS_RP2350_TRNG
+
+// TRNG_DEBUG_CONTROL bypass bits:
+//
+//   bit 1  VNC_BYPASS             Von Neumann corrector
+//   bit 2  TRNG_CRNGT_BYPASS      Continuous Random Number Generator Test
+//   bit 3  AUTO_CORRELATE_BYPASS   Autocorrelation test
+//
+// We bypass Von Neumann and autocorrelation but keep CRNGT.
+//
+//   Von Neumann (bypassed): ~4x throughput cost for bias removal.
+//     Redundant here because SHA-256 conditioning already handles
+//     biased input -- that's what the 2:1 oversampling ratio is for.
+//
+//   Autocorrelation (bypassed): has a non-trivial false-positive rate
+//     at high sampling speeds and halts the TRNG until SW reset on
+//     failure. SHA-256 is not bothered by correlated input. ARM's own
+//     TZ-TRNG 90B reference configuration also bypasses it (0x0A).
+//
+//   CRNGT (kept): compares consecutive 192-bit EHR outputs. Flags if
+//     identical -- false-positive rate 2^-192, throughput cost zero.
+//     This is our early warning for a stuck oscillator or a successful
+//     injection lock to a fixed state.
+#define TRNG_BYPASS_BITS \
+    (TRNG_TRNG_DEBUG_CONTROL_VNC_BYPASS_BITS | \
+    TRNG_TRNG_DEBUG_CONTROL_AUTO_CORRELATE_BYPASS_BITS)
+
+// Collect 192 raw bits (6 x 32-bit words) from the TRNG.
+// Returns false on CRNGT failure (consecutive identical EHR outputs).
+//
+// Holds PICO_SPINLOCK_ID_RAND (the SDK's lock for this peripheral)
+// with interrupts disabled for the duration of the collection, which
+// takes ~192 ROSC cycles (~24us at 8MHz).
+static bool trng_collect_192(uint32_t out[6]) {
+    spin_lock_t *lock = spin_lock_instance(PICO_SPINLOCK_ID_RAND);
+    uint32_t save = spin_lock_blocking(lock);
+
+    trng_hw->trng_debug_control = TRNG_BYPASS_BITS;
+    // One rng_clk cycle between samples. The SDK uses 0 here, but it
+    // also sets debug_control = -1u (full bypass). The behavior of
+    // sample_cnt1 = 0 with health tests still active is undocumented,
+    // so we use 1 to be safe.
+    trng_hw->sample_cnt1 = 1;
+    trng_hw->rnd_source_enable = 1;
+    trng_hw->rng_icr = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+
+    while (trng_hw->trng_busy) {
+    }
+
+    if (trng_hw->rng_isr & TRNG_RNG_ISR_CRNGT_ERR_BITS) {
+        // Drain ehr_data so the hardware starts a fresh collection.
+        // (Reading the last word clears the valid flag.)
+        for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+            (void)trng_hw->ehr_data[i];
+        }
+        trng_hw->rng_icr = TRNG_RNG_ISR_CRNGT_ERR_BITS;
+        spin_unlock(lock, save);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+        out[i] = trng_hw->ehr_data[i];
+    }
+
+    // Switch the inverter chain length for the next collection, using
+    // bits from the sample we just read. Only bits [1:0] matter -- they
+    // select one of four chain lengths, changing the ROSC frequency.
+    // This is borrowed from pico_rand's injection-locking countermeasure.
+    // (The SDK uses its PRNG state here instead of raw output; either
+    // works since the real defense is SHA-256 conditioning, not this.)
+    trng_hw->trng_config = out[0];
+
+    spin_unlock(lock, save);
+    return true;
+}
+
+#endif // HAS_RP2350_TRNG
+
 static void seed_random_bits(BYTE out[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) {
     CRYAL_SHA256_CTX context;
     sha256_init(&context);
-    for (int i = 0; i < 2 * RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN; i++) {
-        for (int j = 0; j < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; j++) {
-            out[j] = rosc_hw->randombit & 1;
-            for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
-                out[j] = (out[j] << 1) ^ (rosc_hw->randombit & 1);
+
+    #ifdef HAS_RP2350_TRNG
+    // 384 bits from TRNG + 384 bits from ROSC = 768 bits into the hash,
+    // giving a 3:1 ratio over the 256-bit output (800-90B wants >= 2:1).
+    // Two independent sources so a failure in one doesn't zero the input.
+
+    // TRNG: 2 x 192 bits.
+    for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        uint32_t trng_buf[6] = {0};
+        for (int attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
+            if (trng_collect_192(trng_buf)) {
+                break;
             }
+            // CRNGT failure. If all 3 retries fail, trng_buf stays zeroed
+            // and we rely entirely on the ROSC contribution below.
         }
+        sha256_update(&context, (const BYTE *)trng_buf, sizeof(trng_buf));
+    }
+
+    // ROSC: 2 x 24 bytes = 384 bits.
+    for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        BYTE rosc_buf[24];
+        rosc_random_bytes(rosc_buf, sizeof(rosc_buf));
+        sha256_update(&context, rosc_buf, sizeof(rosc_buf));
+    }
+    #else
+    // RP2040: ROSC is the only entropy source.
+    for (int i = 0; i < 2 * ROSC_SAFETY_MARGIN; i++) {
+        rosc_random_bytes(out, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
         sha256_update(&context, out, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
     }
+    #endif
+
     sha256_final(&context, out);
 }
 
@@ -61,10 +185,11 @@ static void get_random_bits(BYTE out[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) {
 }
 
 bool common_hal_os_urandom(uint8_t *buffer, mp_uint_t length) {
-#define ROSC_POWER_SAVE (1) // assume ROSC is not necessarily active all the time
+    #define ROSC_POWER_SAVE (1) // assume ROSC is not necessarily active all the time
     #if ROSC_POWER_SAVE
     uint32_t old_rosc_ctrl = rosc_hw->ctrl;
-    rosc_hw->ctrl = (old_rosc_ctrl & ~ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_BITS) | (ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_VALUE_ENABLE << 12);
+    rosc_hw->ctrl = (old_rosc_ctrl & ~ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_BITS)
+        | (ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_VALUE_ENABLE << ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_LSB);
     #endif
     while (length) {
         size_t n = MIN(length, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);