Publish GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9

Author: advisory-database[bot]

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9.json

@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9",
-  "modified": "2026-03-19T22:29:33Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:25:50Z",
   "published": "2026-03-02T23:37:46Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-32038"
   ],
   "summary": "OpenClaw has a sandbox network isolation bypass via docker.network=container:<id>",
   "details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw@2026.2.23`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:<id>`.\n\nThis can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.\n\n### Preconditions and Trust Model Context\nThis issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.\n\n### Details\nCurrent validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:\n\n- `validateNetworkMode(network)` only rejects values in `BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {\"host\"}`.\n- `buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)` validates then forwards `cfg.network` into `--network`.\n- Browser sandbox helper also treats `container:` as an accepted mode in network preparation.\n\nEffective behavior:\n\n- `host` -> blocked\n- `container:<id>` -> accepted and forwarded\n\n### Impact\nType: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.\n\nPractical impact depends on deployment:\n\n- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.\n- Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.\n\n### Remediation\nBlock namespace-join style network modes (including `container:<id>`) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.\n\n\n### Patch Status\nFixed on `main` in commit `14b6eea6e`:\nhttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e\n\nFollow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback):\nhttps://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `>= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
   "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
+    },
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",
       "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N"
@@ -43,6 +47,10 @@
       "type": "WEB",
       "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9"
     },
+    {
+      "type": "ADVISORY",
+      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32038"
+    },
     {
       "type": "WEB",
       "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e"
@@ -54,6 +62,10 @@
     {
       "type": "PACKAGE",
       "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-network-isolation-bypass-via-docker-network-container-parameter"
     }
   ],
   "database_specific": {
@@ -64,6 +76,6 @@
     "severity": "MODERATE",
     "github_reviewed": true,
     "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T23:37:46Z",
-    "nvd_published_at": null
+    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:39Z"
   }
 }