- "details": "### Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process.\n\n### Impact\n\nZitadel provides an API for managing users. The API also allows users to self-manage their own data including updating the email and phone.\n\nDue to an improper permission check, the API allowed setting the verified flag for the email and phone on the own user.\nThis allows users to claim ownership of an email or phone they do not control and potentially bypass email-based security policies.\n\nNote that when changing another user's email or phone, regardless of the verification flag, the permissions were correctly checked.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nSystems running one of the following versions are affected:\n- **4.x**: `4.0.0` through `4.11.0` (including RC versions)\n- **3.x**: `3.0.0` through `3.4.6` (including RC versions)\n- **2.x**: `2.43.0` through `2.71.19`\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch resolves the issue by requiring the correct permission in case the verification flag is provided and only allows self-management of the email address, resp. phone number itself.\n\n4.x: Upgrade to >=[4.11.1](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.11.1)\n3.x: Update to >=[3.4.7](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.7)\n2.x: Update to >=[3.4.7](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.7)\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe recommended solution is to upgrade to a patched version. If an upgrade is not possible, an action (v2) could be used to prevent setting the verification flag on the own user.\n\n### Questions\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [security@zitadel.com](mailto:security@zitadel.com)\n\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was identified by [Oliver Maicher](https://olivermaicher.eu/) during a security audit of a system utilizing Zitadel.",
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