Publish Advisories

GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp
GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99

Author: advisory-database[bot]

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp/GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
+  "id": "GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp",
+  "modified": "2026-03-25T22:00:13Z",
+  "published": "2026-03-25T22:00:13Z",
+  "aliases": [
+    "CVE-2026-33182"
+  ],
+  "summary": "Saloon is vulnerable to SSRF and credential leakage via absolute URL in endpoint overriding base URL",
+  "details": "### Impact\nUsers providing user generated input into the `resolveEndpoint` method on requests.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to Saloon v4+\n\nUpgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4\n\n### Description\nWhen building the request URL, Saloon combined the connector's base URL with the request endpoint. If the endpoint was a valid absolute URL (e.g. https://attacker.example.com/callback), the code used that URL as-is and ignored the base URL. The request—and any authentication headers, cookies, or tokens attached by the connector—was then sent to the attacker-controlled host. If the endpoint could be influenced by user input or configuration (e.g. redirect_uri, callback URL), this allowed server-side request forgery (SSRF) and/or credential leakage to a third-party host. The fix (in the next major version) is to reject absolute URLs in the endpoint: URLHelper::join() throws InvalidArgumentException when the endpoint is a valid absolute URL, unless explicitly allowed, requiring callers to opt-in to the functionality on a per-connector or per-request basis.\n\n### Credits\nSaloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.",
+  "severity": [],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
+        "name": "saloonphp/saloon"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            },
+            {
+              "fixed": "4.0.0"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon/security/advisories/GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon"
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "cwe_ids": [
+      "CWE-522",
+      "CWE-918"
+    ],
+    "severity": "MODERATE",
+    "github_reviewed": true,
+    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T22:00:13Z",
+    "nvd_published_at": null
+  }
+}

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99/GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99.json

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
+  "id": "GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99",
+  "modified": "2026-03-25T22:00:43Z",
+  "published": "2026-03-25T22:00:43Z",
+  "aliases": [
+    "CVE-2026-33183"
+  ],
+  "summary": "Saloon has a Fixture Name Path Traversal Vulnerability",
+  "details": "### Impact\nUsers with MockResponse fixtures that use path traversal.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to Saloon v4+\n\nUpgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4\n\n### Description\nFixture names were used to build file paths under the configured fixture directory without validation. A name containing path segments (e.g. ../traversal or ../../etc/passwd) resulted in a path outside that directory. When the application read a fixture (e.g. for mocking) or wrote one (e.g. when recording responses), it could read or write files anywhere the process had access. If the fixture name was derived from user or attacker-controlled input (e.g. request parameters or config), this constituted a path traversal vulnerability and could lead to disclosure of sensitive files or overwriting of critical files. The fix adds validation in the fixture layer (rejecting names with /, \\, .., or null bytes, and restricting to a safe character set) and defence-in-depth in the storage layer (ensuring the resolved path remains under the base directory before any read or write).\n\n### Credits\nSaloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V4",
+      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
+    }
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
+        "name": "saloonphp/saloon"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            },
+            {
+              "fixed": "4.0.0"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon/security/advisories/GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon"
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "cwe_ids": [
+      "CWE-125",
+      "CWE-787"
+    ],
+    "severity": "MODERATE",
+    "github_reviewed": true,
+    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T22:00:43Z",
+    "nvd_published_at": null
+  }
+}