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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-955r-262c-33jc",
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"modified": "2026-03-30T19:15:30Z",
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"published": "2026-03-30T19:15:30Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "Telnyx has malicious code in PyPI versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nOn March 27, 2026, a threat actor used compromised PyPI credentials to publish malicious versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 of the `telnyx` Python package directly to PyPI. These versions contain credential-stealing malware and were not published through the legitimate GitHub release pipeline.\n\n## Exposure Window\n\n| Version | Published (UTC) | Quarantined (UTC) | Exposure |\n|---------|-----------------|-------------------|----------|\n| 4.87.1 (broken) | 2026-03-27 03:51 | 2026-03-27 10:13 | 6h 22m |\n| 4.87.2 (functional) | 2026-03-27 04:07 | 2026-03-27 10:13 | 6h 6m |\n\n\n**Both versions were quarantined by PyPI at 2026-03-27 10:13 UTC.**\n\n**Note:** Version 4.87.1 contained a typo that prevented the malware from executing. Only 4.87.2 was fully functional.\n\n## Who Is Affected\n\nYou may be affected if:\n- You installed or upgraded the `telnyx` Python package between 03:51 UTC and 10:13 UTC on March 27, 2026\n- You ran `pip install telnyx` without pinning a version and received 4.87.1 or 4.87.2\n- A dependency in your project pulled in `telnyx` as a transitive, unpinned dependency\n\nYou are NOT affected if:\n- You pinned to version 4.87.0 or earlier\n- You installed before March 27, 2026 and did not upgrade\n- You built from GitHub source (malicious code was never committed to the repository)\n\n## Attack Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe attacker obtained the PyPI API token and uploaded malicious packages directly to PyPI, bypassing the GitHub release pipeline entirely. No malicious commits exist in the GitHub repository.\n\n### Malicious Behavior\n\nThe malware is injected into `telnyx/_client.py` (74 additional lines) and executes on `import telnyx`:\n\n**Linux/macOS:**\n1. Spawns detached subprocess to survive parent exit\n2. Downloads payload hidden inside WAV audio file (steganography) from C2\n3. Harvests credentials: SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes tokens, Docker configs, .env files, database credentials, crypto wallets\n4. If Kubernetes access found, deploys privileged pods to all nodes for lateral movement\n5. Encrypts with AES-256-CBC + RSA-4096, exfiltrates to C2\n\n**Windows:**\n1. Downloads binary hidden inside WAV file from C2\n2. Drops as `msbuild.exe` in Startup folder for persistence\n3. Executes with hidden window\n\n### Version Differences\n\n| Version | Status | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| 4.87.1 | Broken | Typo: `Setup()` instead of `setup()` caused NameError |\n| 4.87.2 | Functional | Attacker uploaded 16 minutes later to fix their own casing error; full attack chain operational |\n\n## Verified Safe Version\n\n| Version | File | SHA-256 |\n|---------|------|--------|\n| **4.87.0** | `telnyx-4.87.0-py3-none-any.whl` | `5aeb8172c29ade224e6c2d166713f304596aa21e3dbfa5b6b2b028e6997f6bd2` |\n| **4.87.0** | `telnyx-4.87.0.tar.gz` | `3f093a85c313c2b779594f99fc07f453f1a7fd8785878d963688c531ff94d03a` |\n\n## Recommended Actions\n\n### 1. Check If You Are Affected\n\n```bash\n# Check installed version\npip show telnyx | grep Version\n\n# Check pip cache for telnyx versions\npip cache list telnyx 2>/dev/null\n\n# Check when telnyx was installed (modification time)\nls -la $(python -c \"import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[0])\")/telnyx* 2>/dev/null\n```\n\n### 2. Remove Compromised Versions\n\n```bash\npip uninstall telnyx\n```\n\n### 3. Rotate All Potentially Exposed Secrets\n\nIf there is any possibility that version 4.87.1 or 4.87.2 was installed in your environment, treat all accessible secrets as compromised:\n\n- SSH keys\n- AWS/GCP/Azure credentials\n- Kubernetes tokens and service accounts\n- Docker registry credentials\n- Database passwords\n- API keys in .env files\n- Telnyx API keys\n\n### 4. Check for Persistence (Linux/macOS)\n\n```bash\n# Check for malicious systemd service\nsystemctl --user status audiomon 2>/dev/null\nls -la ~/.config/audiomon/ 2>/dev/null\n\n# Check state file\nls -la /tmp/.initd_state 2>/dev/null\n```\n\n### 5. Check for Persistence (Windows)\n\n```powershell\n# Check Startup folder\nGet-ChildItem \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\msbuild.exe\"\n```\n\n### 6. Pin to Safe Version\n\n\n```bash\npip install telnyx==4.87.0\n```\n\nOr in requirements.txt:\n```\ntelnyx==4.87.0\n```\n\n## Indicators of Compromise\n\n### Malicious Package Hashes\n\n| File | SHA-256 |\n|------|--------|\n| `telnyx-4.87.1-py3-none-any.whl` | `7321caa303fe96ded0492c747d2f353c4f7d17185656fe292ab0a59e2bd0b8d9` |\n| `telnyx-4.87.2-py3-none-any.whl` | `cd08115806662469bbedec4b03f8427b97c8a4b3bc1442dc18b72b4e19395fe3` |\n\n### Network\n\n| IoC | Type |\n|-----|------|\n| `83.142.209.203` | C2 IP address |\n| `http://83.142.209.203:8080/ringtone.wav` | Payload endpoint (Linux/macOS) |\n| `http://83.142.209.203:8080/hangup.wav` | Payload endpoint (Windows) |\n| `http://83.142.209.203:8080/raw` | Persistence polling endpoint |\n\n### Filesystem\n\n| Path | Platform | Purpose |\n|------|----------|--------|\n| `~/.config/audiomon/audiomon.py` | Linux/macOS | Persistence implant |\n| `~/.config/systemd/user/audiomon.service` | Linux | Persistence service |\n| `/tmp/.initd_state` | Linux/macOS | State tracking |\n| `%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\msbuild.exe` | Windows | Persistence binary |\n| `msbuild.exe.lock` | Windows | 12-hour cooldown lock |\n\n### Exfiltration\n\n- Archive name: `tpcp.tar.gz`\n- HTTP header: `X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz`\n- Encryption: AES-256-CBC + RSA-4096 OAEP\n\n## Attribution\n\nThis attack is attributed to **TeamPCP** with high confidence based on:\n\n- Identical RSA-4096 public key as the LiteLLM compromise (March 24, 2026)\n- `tpcp.tar.gz` archive naming convention (TeamPCP signature)\n- Identical AES-256-CBC + RSA OAEP encryption scheme\n- Same credential harvesting targets and techniques\n\nRSA Key Hash:\n- PEM SHA-256: `4eceb569b4330565b93058465beab0e6d5ea09cfba8e7f29d7be1b5a2abd958a`\n\n## Resources\n\n- https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python/issues/235\n- https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/teampcp-strikes-again-telnyx-compromised-three-days-after-litellm\n- https://ramimac.me/teampcp",
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"severity": [],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "PyPI",
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"name": "telnyx"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "4.87.1"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "4.87.2"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python/security/advisories/GHSA-955r-262c-33jc"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python/issues/235"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://ramimac.me/teampcp"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/teampcp-strikes-again-telnyx-compromised-three-days-after-litellm"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-506"
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],
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T19:15:30Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-v895-833r-8c45",
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"modified": "2026-03-30T19:17:11Z",
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"published": "2026-03-30T19:17:11Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34385"
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],
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"summary": "Fleet's Apple MDM profile delivery has second-order SQL Injection that can compromise the database",
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"details": "### Summary\n\nA critical second-order SQL Injection vulnerability in Fleet's Apple MDM profile delivery pipeline could allow an attacker with a valid MDM enrollment certificate to exfiltrate or modify the contents of the Fleet database, including user credentials, API tokens, and device enrollment secrets.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf Apple MDM is enabled, an attacker controlling an enrolled device can send a malicious UDID during the MDM Authenticate check-in. The UDID is stored safely via parameterized queries, but is later interpolated directly into SQL when the async worker processes the job. This enables blind, boolean-based, and UNION-based SQL injection across four simultaneous subqueries.\n\nBecause Fleet's database driver is configured with `multiStatements=true`, the attacker can also execute stacked queries, enabling arbitrary writes to the database. This includes inserting new admin accounts, modifying configuration, deploying malicious profiles or scripts to managed devices, and deleting data.\n\nExploitation requires a valid SCEP-issued enrollment certificate (mTLS), but any enrolled device, including attacker-controlled devices, can exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThis issue does not affect instances where Apple MDM is disabled.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible, affected Fleet users should temporarily disable Apple MDM.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nSend an email to [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)\n\nJoin #fleet in [[osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)\n\n### Credits\n\nFleet thanks@secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Go",
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"name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "4.81.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-v895-833r-8c45"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34385"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-89"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T19:17:11Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T19:16:43Z"
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}
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}

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