+ "details": "### Summary\n\nIn `objects/like.php`, the `getLike()` method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (`?`) for `users_id` but directly concatenates `$this->videos_id` into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the `videos_id` value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection.\n\n### Details\n\n**File:** `objects/like.php`\n\n**Vulnerable code:**\n```php\n$sql = \"SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = \".$this->videos_id.\" LIMIT 1;\";\n$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"i\", [$this->users_id]);\n```\n\nThe query mixes a parameterized placeholder for `users_id` with raw string concatenation for `videos_id`. The `$this->videos_id` value originates from user-supplied request input (typically a POST/GET parameter identifying the video being liked/disliked) and is not cast to integer or validated before being embedded in the SQL string.\n\nAll other queries in the same file correctly use `?` placeholders for both columns:\n```php\n// Correct pattern used elsewhere:\n$sql = \"SELECT count(*) as total FROM likes WHERE videos_id = ? AND like = 1\";\n```\n\nThe inconsistency means any attacker who can submit a like/dislike action with a crafted `videos_id` can inject SQL. Since like/dislike actions are typically available to any authenticated user, the attack surface is broad.\n\n### PoC\n\nAn attacker sends a like request with an injected `videos_id`:\n```\nPOST /objects/likeAjax.json.php\nvideos_id=1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -\n```\n\nThis causes the backend to execute:\n```sql\nSELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = 1 AND videos_id = 1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- - LIMIT 1;\n```\n\nResult: full database read — user credentials, emails, private content, and any other data accessible to the MySQL user.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Authentication required:** Yes (must be logged in to like a video), but all registered users qualify\n- **Impact:** Full database read via UNION-based injection; potential for data modification or deletion depending on DB user privileges\n- **Fix:** Replace the concatenation with a second `?` placeholder and pass `$this->videos_id` as a bound integer parameter",
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