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Security: Glory42/RigCheck

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security problems privately, not in a public issue:

Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker could do with it. I aim to reply within a week. Once a fix is released, you'll be credited in the advisory unless you'd rather not be.

rigcheck is a one-person side project, so there's no bug bounty.

Supported versions

Only the latest release gets fixes.

What's in scope

rigcheck runs on your machine with your user's permissions. The parts worth a close look:

Area What it does
Files it reads /proc, /sys, /etc/os-release, and Steam's folders (libraryfolders.vdf, app manifests, cached cover art)
Programs it runs vulkaninfo --summary and nvidia-smi from PATH; xdg-open to open a link in your browser
Files it writes ~/.config/rigcheck/: settings.json, and steam-api-key (mode 600) if you add one; ~/.local/share/rigcheck/games.db; ~/.cache/rigcheck/: fetched.db, images/ and owned-games.json
Network Read-only requests to GitHub Releases, Steam's store API and Steam's image CDN, plus the Steam Web API only if you add your own key. All go through crates/net, which refuses any other host; see ROADMAP §6

Especially interesting: anything that makes the app talk to another host, run another program, or read or write outside the paths above, and anything in a downloaded games.db or Steam file that can do more than produce a wrong verdict.

Wrong verdicts themselves aren't security issues. Report them as a Wrong verdict issue.

How the game database is checked

The app downloads games.db only from this repository's db-latest release, and only after:

  1. manifest.sig is a valid Ed25519 signature of manifest.json by the key whose public half is built into the app (MANIFEST_KEY in app/src/download.rs). Only the Build games.db workflow can sign: the private key is a secret of the db-signing environment, which only master may use.
  2. The download matches the manifest's size and SHA-256, unpacks within a size limit, and holds no SQL (triggers, views, virtual tables) other than the pipeline's own, before anything writes to it.
  3. It's a newer build than the installed one, so an older file can't be served again.

If the signing key is ever lost or exposed: make a new one (openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519), store it as the MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY secret of the db-signing environment, put its public half in MANIFEST_KEY, and release the app. Until users update, their app keeps its installed database.

Verifying a download

Every release since 1.2.0 carries a SHA256SUMS file and a build provenance attestation for the AppImage, .deb, .rpm and tarball. To check that a file was built by this repository's release workflow from a tagged commit:

gh attestation verify rigcheck-1.2.0-x86_64.AppImage --repo Glory42/rigcheck

There aren't any published security advisories