Please report security problems privately, not in a public issue:
- Preferred: GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability").
- Or email me@gorkemkaryol.dev.
Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker could do with it. I aim to reply within a week. Once a fix is released, you'll be credited in the advisory unless you'd rather not be.
rigcheck is a one-person side project, so there's no bug bounty.
Only the latest release gets fixes.
rigcheck runs on your machine with your user's permissions. The parts worth a close look:
| Area | What it does |
|---|---|
| Files it reads | /proc, /sys, /etc/os-release, and Steam's folders (libraryfolders.vdf, app manifests, cached cover art) |
| Programs it runs | vulkaninfo --summary and nvidia-smi from PATH; xdg-open to open a link in your browser |
| Files it writes | ~/.config/rigcheck/: settings.json, and steam-api-key (mode 600) if you add one; ~/.local/share/rigcheck/games.db; ~/.cache/rigcheck/: fetched.db, images/ and owned-games.json |
| Network | Read-only requests to GitHub Releases, Steam's store API and Steam's image CDN, plus the Steam Web API only if you add your own key. All go through crates/net, which refuses any other host; see ROADMAP §6 |
Especially interesting: anything that makes the app talk to another host, run another program, or read or write outside the paths above, and anything in a downloaded games.db or Steam file that can do more than produce a wrong verdict.
Wrong verdicts themselves aren't security issues. Report them as a Wrong verdict issue.
The app downloads games.db only from this repository's db-latest release, and only after:
manifest.sigis a valid Ed25519 signature ofmanifest.jsonby the key whose public half is built into the app (MANIFEST_KEYinapp/src/download.rs). Only the Build games.db workflow can sign: the private key is a secret of thedb-signingenvironment, which onlymastermay use.- The download matches the manifest's size and SHA-256, unpacks within a size limit, and holds no SQL (triggers, views, virtual tables) other than the pipeline's own, before anything writes to it.
- It's a newer build than the installed one, so an older file can't be served again.
If the signing key is ever lost or exposed: make a new one (openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519), store it as the MANIFEST_SIGNING_KEY secret of the db-signing environment, put its public half in MANIFEST_KEY, and release the app. Until users update, their app keeps its installed database.
Every release since 1.2.0 carries a SHA256SUMS file and a build provenance attestation for the AppImage, .deb, .rpm and tarball. To check that a file was built by this repository's release workflow from a tagged commit:
gh attestation verify rigcheck-1.2.0-x86_64.AppImage --repo Glory42/rigcheck