Record the Windows peer-link pipe squat as not defended

docs/specs/security.md

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Source of truth: root scripts in `package.json`; native jobs in `.github/workflo
 
 - **A process running as you.** `dor`, its socket, and every file mode bound other local accounts, never a program already running under your own account; an agent holding `dor` has exactly the power of the person at the keyboard, and the Tool trust prompt is no boundary against it ([The dor control socket](./security-local.md#the-dor-control-socket)).
 - **The Windows `dor` pipe carries no ACL of ours.** A named pipe has no directory to harden, so an unguessable name and the token handshake are the whole of it ([The dor control socket](./security-local.md#the-dor-control-socket)).
+- **Another Windows account can take the VS Code peer-link pipe's name first.** Every window must bind the same name, so it is derived, not random, and Windows lists every pipe to every account; whoever creates it first keeps remote control and peer surfaces down, though the token handshake serves them nothing ([Persisted state](./security-local.md#persisted-state)).
 - **A local HTML or SVG document you open, or confirm from a document link, can send its contents off the machine.** The file viewer's content policy confines what the page loads, not where its scripts navigate ([Local-file viewer](./security-local.md#local-file-viewer)).
 - **A mermaid sanitizer bypass in a Markdown document you open.** Its diagrams reach the editor page through mermaid's strict sanitizer, not the editor's allowlist, so a bypass would run script holding the editor's save, image, and document-open routes; an open of a page that runs its own scripts still waits on Dormouse's own dialog ([Local-file viewer](./security-local.md#local-file-viewer), [Terminal output](./security-local.md#terminal-output)).
 - **A Tool trust grant on an upstream URL trusts the URL a checkout claims.** Any directory whose own `.git/config` claims an already-granted upstream shares that grant; a folder-only grant is not shared ([Dor Tool configuration](./security-local.md#dor-tool-configuration)).

docs/specs/vscode.md

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ Source of truth: `VsCodeBurrowStateStore` in `vscode-ext/src/burrow-store.ts`, `
 
 **Trust.** The socket path is derived, not secret, so two layers stand between it and this installation's terminals.
 
-*The directory.* On unix every bind and connect is held to `peerDirIsSafe()`, the predicate the `dor` control socket uses (`docs/specs/security-local.md` → "The dor control socket"). A loose directory we own is tightened; anything else is somebody else's and **the peer link stands down for good**, releasing the callers waiting on the contention. Windows named pipes carry their own ACL and skip this layer.
+*The directory.* On unix every bind and connect is held to `peerDirIsSafe()`, the predicate the `dor` control socket uses (`docs/specs/security-local.md` → "The dor control socket"). A loose directory we own is tightened; anything else is somebody else's and **the peer link stands down for good**, releasing the callers waiting on the contention. Windows pipes have no directory and skip this layer (`docs/specs/security.md` → "What is not defended").
 
 *The handshake.* The shared secret is a mode-0600 `burrow.peer-token` in `globalStorageUri`, **created once with an exclusive `wx` write rather than a rename** so two windows starting together agree on one token. **Treat an empty read as *not yet written*, never as the token**, waiting it out with a bounded retry (rationale); **exhausting that wait latches the same permanent stand-down** as an unsafe directory. The token **never crosses the socket**; three frames prove mutual knowledge of it:
 

scripts/spec-word-budgets.json

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
   "docs/specs/security-local.md": 5900,
   "docs/specs/security-remote.md": 7100,
   "docs/specs/security-supply-chain.md": 1650,
-  "docs/specs/security.md": 2600,
+  "docs/specs/security.md": 2650,
   "docs/specs/shortcuts.md": 1150,
   "docs/specs/standalone.md": 6450,
   "docs/specs/terminal-context.md": 950,

vscode-ext/src/peer-link.ts

@@ -145,8 +145,9 @@ function peerDirPath(): string {
  * possibly on purpose, and no amount of retrying makes it ours — so the caller
  * stands the peer link down for good rather than spinning against it.
  *
- * Windows named pipes are not filesystem objects and carry their own ACL, so
- * there is nothing here for them to check.
+ * Windows named pipes are not filesystem objects, so there is no directory
+ * here to check; the squat that leaves open is recorded in
+ * `docs/specs/security.md` → "What is not defended".
  *
  * The same predicate is duplicated as `ensureControlDir()` in
  * standalone/sidecar/dor-control-server.js (sync fs, returns the directory