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[LOW] Pin CI actions to immutable commits - #47
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Same comments as in jeremyevans/tilt#48 (comment) . As an additional problem with this approach, if you pin the commit hash, you don't get updated Ruby patch versions without updating the commit hash, which can prevent detection of regressions in patch versions. |
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Summary
@v6and@v1.GITHUB_TOKENpermission boundary and CI behavior.Security impact
GitHub currently resolves both third-party actions through mutable refs. If either ref moves unexpectedly or its upstream repository is compromised, changed action code can execute in Erubi's test jobs without an Erubi commit. The job does not publish packages or declare secrets, and fork pull requests do not receive repository secrets, so I rate this LOW urgency.
Verification
actions/checkout@v6resolves tod23441a48e516b6c34aea4fa41551a30e30af803.ruby/setup-ruby@v1resolves to95ef2b042f9d7a56d8268cba8559e2842e2ad01b..github/workflows/ci.ymlwith Ruby YAML.git diff --check.Limitations
Hosted CI remains the authoritative check for the full MRI/JRuby/TruffleRuby matrix.
Breaking changes
None. Runtime code and package contents are unchanged.