Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub security advisories. Include the tailhome version, how you deployed it, steps to reproduce and the impact.
Keep exploit details and secrets out of public issues.
tailhome has no login of its own. Your tailnet's access policy controls who can reach the home node, or svc:home with an OAuth client. See Security and privacy for catalog visibility.
Hiding a Service or device removes it from the page and JSON lists, but does not restrict access.
Keep OAuth credentials, auth keys and persistent state private, and redact them from reports.
Setting TAILHOME_SHARE_ADMINS enables sharing for those exact Tailscale login names, with no separate sign-in. See setup for policy and lifetime controls.
- Anyone on the internet or tailnet can reach the shared app's routes, with public paths matching upstream paths.
- Both connections use the same proxy, Stop and expiry controls. Limits cap concurrent connections and requests; there is no rate limiting.
- Only WebSocket upgrades are allowed.
- Client-supplied identity and forwarding headers are stripped. Funnel visitors' public IP is sent as
X-Forwarded-For; tailnet callers' IPs are never sent. - Apps see connections from the share node. Never share apps that trust identity headers, skip login for tailnet peers or lock out users by source IP.
- Preview shares last at most 24 hours and check only the card endpoint every 10 seconds. Card changes or removal stop sharing at the next check; unreachable endpoints stop it after three failed checks, about 30 seconds.
- With a separate card mount (the skill's default) or no card, stopping only the dev server leaves the share up with 502 errors. A different app on the same port without republishing stays public until the share ends.
- Running preview shares do not follow catalog changes to tags, overrides or preview ports. They continue until expiry, Stop, removal or a card change.
- The OAuth secret can create pre-approved, Funnel-capable nodes with access to everything granted to
tag:tailhome-share, outside tailhome's controls. - Run without root or a Docker socket, and protect the secret, state directory and backups, including certificates.
- In Service mode, tailhome trusts
Tailscale-User-Loginon a loopback listener. Local users or processes in the same host or container network namespace can impersonate admins; keep the listener private and untrusted processes out. - Sibling
.ts.netsites can set parent-domain cookies and send requests withSameSitecookies. Open untrusted shares in a separate browser from tailnet administration. - Hostnames and the tailnet name stay in public certificate logs. Random names are not secrets.
- Run only one tailhome process per state directory to avoid losing saved shares.
- Stop tailhome and revoke the OAuth client.
- Remove the Funnel attribute for
tag:tailhome-sharefrom your policy. - Delete every
tag:tailhome-sharedevice in Machines, including any tailhome did not record. - Rotate app and node secrets, fix the cause, create a new OAuth client and re-enable sharing.