chore(deps): update pnpm.catalog.default nuxt to v4.4.7 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
nuxt (source)	4.4.6 → 4.4.7

---

Nuxt: Dev server discloses project absolute path and persistent workspace UUID via /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json

GHSA-rq7w-g337-39qq

More information

Details

Summary

When running nuxt dev, Nuxt registers an unauthenticated route at /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json that returns the absolute filesystem path of the project root and a per-project UUID persisted to node_modules/.cache/nuxt/chrome-workspace.json. The route is enabled by default via experimental.chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings: true.

The endpoint exists to let Chrome DevTools' Workspace integration map sources to the developer's local checkout. The handler is registered directly on nitro.options.devHandlers and does not pass through the CORS / origin wrapper that the rest of the dev pipeline uses, so it has no host / origin / Sec-Fetch-Site check of its own.

Impact

Dev-server only. Production builds do not register the route.

Two values are disclosed:

• workspace.root: the absolute filesystem path of the project (commonly reveals the OS username and the on-disk project name).
• workspace.uuid: a v4 UUID persisted to node_modules/.cache/nuxt/chrome-workspace.json, stable across dev-server restarts and re-clones.

Threat model

The response carries no Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. A cross-origin fetch() from an arbitrary malicious page is therefore blocked by the browser's same-origin policy and cannot read the body. The two realistic recovery paths are:

1. LAN-adjacent attacker when the developer runs nuxt dev --host (or otherwise binds to a non-loopback interface). A plain curl http://<dev-lan-ip>:3000/.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json returns the JSON; no browser, no CORS.
2. DNS rebinding against the default loopback dev server. A page the developer visits resolves to the attacker, then re-resolves to 127.0.0.1 after the TTL; the browser believes the request is same-origin and reads the response.

Affected versions

nuxt@4.0.0-alpha.1 (PR #​32084) through nuxt@4.4.6. 3.x is not affected.

Reproduction

npx nuxt dev
curl -s http://localhost:3000/.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json

##### {"workspace":{"uuid":"...","root":"/Users/<name>/..."}}

Workaround

Set experimental: { chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings: false } in nuxt.config.ts. Chrome DevTools' Workspace auto-integration will stop working; the dev server is otherwise unaffected.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 by #​35201 (commit 55c75b78). The handler is now routed through the same host / origin gate the rest of the dev server uses, so the endpoint only responds to requests that look local.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7w-g337-39qq
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35201
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/55c75b78c989b8bd210837b0e5faaebbf2b87b15
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rq7w-g337-39qq

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Nuxt: URL-handling weaknesses in navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp: SSR open redirect, client-side script execution via the open option, and protocol-relative bypass in reloadNuxtApp

GHSA-c9cv-mq2m-ppp3

More information

Details

Summary

Three weaknesses in Nuxt's client-navigation URL handling, all reachable
from documented public APIs (navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp):

1. SSR open redirect in navigateTo via path-normalisation bypass.
   navigateTo decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw
   input with hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true }). Inputs such as
   /..//evil.com, /.//evil.com, /%2e%2e//evil.com, or
   /app/..//evil.com slipped past that check because they start with
   /, but WHATWG URL parsing then normalised them to the
   protocol-relative pathname //evil.com. The normalised value was
   written to the Location response header and into the
   <meta http-equiv="refresh"> body of the SSR redirect page, so a
   victim's browser would resolve the redirect cross-origin to the
   attacker's host.

2. Client-side script execution via navigateTo({ open: ... }). The
   client-side early-open handler called window.open(toPath, ...) without
   applying the isScriptProtocol check that gates the normal navigateTo
   path. A target of javascript:... (or another script-capable scheme)
   passed to navigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) therefore executed in the
   application's origin instead of being rejected.

3. Open redirect in reloadNuxtApp via protocol-relative bypass.
   reloadNuxtApp({ path }) rejects script-capable protocols by parsing
   the path with new URL(path, window.location.href) and checking the
   resolved protocol against isScriptProtocol. Protocol-relative paths
   such as //evil.com resolve to the current page's protocol (https:),
   which passes that check; the value is then assigned to
   window.location.href, which the browser treats as a cross-origin
   redirect. This is the same protocol-relative bypass family as (1), in
   a different sink.

Impact

For (1), the practical risk is phishing or OAuth-code theft against any
Nuxt app that forwards user-controlled input (for example a ?next=
query parameter on a login route) into navigateTo on the server. The
framework documents that navigateTo blocks external hosts unless
external: true is passed, so maintainers commonly rely on it as the
safe path for post-login redirects.

For (2), any app that passes a user-controlled URL into
navigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) was vulnerable to reflected XSS in
the application's first-party origin.

For (3), any app that forwards user-controlled input into
reloadNuxtApp({ path }) could be redirected cross-origin for phishing
or OAuth-code theft, even on releases that already shipped the
isScriptProtocol guard added by #​35115.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 and backported to nuxt@3.21.7. The three sinks
are addressed by:

• Path-normalisation bypass in navigateTo:
  • 4.x: commit 2cce6fb0
  • 3.x: commit 1f2dd5e7
• navigateTo({ open }) script-protocol guard:
  • 4.x: #​35206 (commit 3394716d)
  • 3.x: commit 62fc32ed
• Protocol-relative bypass in reloadNuxtApp:
  • 4.x: commit e447a793
  • 3.x: commit 6497d99d

Workarounds

• For (1): validate redirect targets before passing them to navigateTo,
  for example reject any input where
  new URL(target, 'http://localhost').pathname starts with //, or
  only accept a known allow-list of paths.
• For (2): reject any user-controlled URL whose protocol is not in an
  allow-list (typically just http: and https:) before passing it to
  navigateTo({ open: ... }).
• For (3): same shape as (1). Reject paths starting with // (or where
  new URL(path, window.location.href).host !== window.location.host)
  before passing to reloadNuxtApp({ path }).

References

• CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
• CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Credits

Reported by Anthropic / Claude as ANT-2026-S08HN6DH through Anthropic's
coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme.

The reloadNuxtApp protocol-relative bypass (sink 3) was independently
reported by @​alcls01111 via GitHub's
coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-w7fp-2cfv-4837), closed as a
duplicate of this advisory.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-c9cv-mq2m-ppp3
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35115
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35206
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/1f2dd5e78c77576437138e97671965573c232835
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/2cce6fb02e621196d56df92e05594e07469b5a6d
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/3394716d4a913cba904b028df5338f2aead50032
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/62fc32eddf648b00a3890141e0235d2a222b024d
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/6497d99dd106254abd089f6a263d7773869a343b
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/e447a793c47766834f7497f8412a76cd56fd8ee1
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c9cv-mq2m-ppp3

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Nuxt: Route-rule middleware bypass via case-sensitivity mismatch between vue-router and the routeRules matcher

CVE-2026-53721 / GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47

More information

Details

Impact

Nuxt looks up routeRules for the current navigation by calling
getRouteRules({ path: to.path }) from the page-router plugin and the
no-pages router plugin. The compiled routeRules matcher (built on
rou3) performs case-sensitive matching, while vue-router is configured
with its default sensitive: false and matches paths case-insensitively.

The two routers therefore disagree on which rules apply to a given
request path: vue-router still matches the page record for
/Admin/dashboard, but the routeRules lookup for the same path
returns no match. Any appMiddleware declared via routeRules is never
added to the middleware set and never runs, on both SSR and client
navigations. The same path skips other path-keyed route rules in the
same way (ssr, redirect, appLayout, and the prerender / payload
hints used client-side).

For applications using routeRules with appMiddleware as an
authorization gate (a documented pattern), an attacker can flip the case
of any static segment in a protected URL (for example /Admin/dashboard
instead of /admin/dashboard) to render the protected page with the
middleware skipped. The server returns the fully server-rendered page
including any useFetch / useAsyncData results captured during SSR.

This is an instance of CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity)
leading to CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) for apps that treat
appMiddleware as an authorization boundary.

Mitigating factors

• Only affects apps that use routeRules.appMiddleware. The more
  idiomatic definePageMeta({ middleware }) is bound to the matched
  route record and is unaffected.
• Nuxt route middleware is documented as an app-layer concern, not a
  server-side auth boundary; well-built apps enforce authorization
  again at the API / data-fetching layer.
• Apps that explicitly set router.options.sensitive = true are not
  affected.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 (commit 07e39cd6) and backported to nuxt@3.21.7 (commit 3f3e3fa7). The fix normalizes the path used for routeRules lookups so it matches vue-router's default case-insensitive semantics.

Workarounds

Until you can upgrade, you can mitigate by either:

1. Setting router.options.sensitive = true so vue-router matches
   case-sensitively (this changes route-matching behaviour app-wide).
2. Moving security-critical middleware off routeRules.appMiddleware
   and onto definePageMeta({ middleware: [...] }) on the protected
   page components, which is bound to the matched record.
3. Enforcing authorization at the API / data-fetching layer (which you
   should be doing in any case).

Credit

Reported by Anthropic / Claude through Anthropic's coordinated
vulnerability disclosure process. Reference: ANT-2026-9FSEBYMC.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53721
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/07e39cd6f26e407b4192b7865bd17bc44536b9bb
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/3f3e3fa7b5eec8e495f4f8ce0a54813a8875a11e
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Nuxt dev server vite-node IPC socket is world-connectable on Linux

GHSA-534h-c3cw-v3h9

More information

Details

Impact

When running nuxt dev on Linux (Node.js 20+, outside Docker / StackBlitz), Nuxt's internal vite-node IPC server binds to a Linux abstract-namespace Unix socket (\0nuxt-vite-node-<pid>-<ts>.sock). Abstract sockets have no filesystem inode and therefore no permission bits: any local UID on the host that can read /proc/net/unix can enumerate the socket and connect to it.

The IPC server does not perform any peer-credential or shared-secret check before dispatching requests. The module request type passes its moduleId field straight into Vite's SSR fetchModule(), which is not gated by Vite's HTTP-layer server.fs.allow deny-list. A co-resident unprivileged local user can therefore request paths like /home/<dev>/project/.env?raw or ~/.ssh/id_rsa?raw and read the developer's secrets through the dev server's SSR plugin pipeline. The resolve request type additionally enables filesystem probing.

This affects developers running nuxt dev on shared multi-tenant Linux hosts (lab machines, shared bastions, CI runners shared between jobs without per-job container isolation). It does not affect:

• Production builds (nuxt build / nuxt start). The IPC server only runs in development.
• macOS or Windows developers.
• Docker / StackBlitz environments, which already fall back to a filesystem socket.
• Single-user laptops or per-job containerised CI.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 (commit 1f9f4767) and backported to nuxt@3.21.7 (commit c293bf95).

The fix removes the abstract-namespace branch entirely. The IPC server now always binds to a filesystem Unix socket under the OS temp directory and explicitly chmod 0600s it after listen(), restricting connections to the owning UID. If the chmod fails for any reason, the server closes rather than serve requests on an unrestricted channel.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately on an affected host:

• Run nuxt dev inside a container or VM with no other tenants. Docker already triggers the filesystem-socket fallback in vulnerable versions and that fallback is unaffected.
• Bind the dev process to a single-user namespace (unshare -U, rootless containers).
• Restrict /proc/net/unix visibility via hidepid=2 mount options where applicable, though this is partial mitigation only.

References

• Affected file: packages/vite/src/plugins/vite-node.ts
• CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions

Credit

Reported by Anthropic / Claude as part of Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme, reference ANT-2026-MSNKZFAT. Thanks to the Anthropic security team for the report and the detailed reproduction.

Independently reported by @​alcls01111 via GitHub's coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-5gvc-46gq-948j), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-534h-c3cw-v3h9
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/1f9f4767a8725104da9bee872bb8d35246f25ae5
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/c293bf9503ccb3bc9559bff4a1f592f99063c9ea
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-534h-c3cw-v3h9

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Nuxt: Reflected XSS in <NuxtLink> via unsanitised javascript: or data: URL

CVE-2026-53722 / GHSA-934w-87qh-qr26

More information

Details

Summary

<NuxtLink> did not validate the URL scheme of values bound to its to or href props before rendering them into the href attribute of the underlying <a> element. When an application binds attacker-controlled input (a query parameter, a CMS field, a user-supplied profile URL) to <NuxtLink :to> or :href, the attacker can supply a javascript: or vbscript: URL that is reflected verbatim into the rendered markup. Clicking the link executes the supplied script in the origin of the Nuxt application, resulting in reflected DOM-based cross-site scripting. A data:text/html,... payload reflected through the same sink does not execute in the application's origin but enables a same-tab phishing surface anchored to a legitimate application link.

The same value was exposed to consumers of the component's custom slot via the href and route.href props, so applications that re-bind those values to their own anchors were affected identically.

Unlike the previously reported navigateTo issue (CVE-2024-34343), the sink here is the rendered anchor itself; the existing isScriptProtocol checks in navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp are not on the code path. The onClick handler intentionally returns early for external links so the browser's native protocol-based navigation runs.

Affected component

• File: packages/nuxt/src/app/components/nuxt-link.ts
• Sink: h('a', { href: href.value, ... }) in the default render, plus the href / route.href props passed to the custom slot.
• Broken check: external auto-detection treated any hasProtocol(path, { acceptRelative: true }) value as an "external link", then rendered the value directly as <a href> without rejecting script-capable protocols. There was no equivalent of the navigateTo isScriptProtocol(protocol) gate in this path.

Impact

Any Nuxt application that binds user-controlled values to <NuxtLink :to> / :href was vulnerable. Common shapes: profile-link rendering (<NuxtLink :to="user.website">), "share this" / "open in new tab" handlers that pass through a query parameter, CMS-driven landing pages that render <NuxtLink :to="cms.cta.url">, and marketplace listings that show seller-supplied links.

For javascript: / vbscript: the primitive is reflected XSS in the application's first-party origin (session theft for non-HttpOnly cookies, CSRF token theft, account takeover via DOM rewriting, credential harvesting via fake login overlays). For data:text/html,... the attacker gets a same-tab phishing surface anchored to a legitimate application link.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 (commit 0103ce06) and backported to nuxt@3.21.7 (commit 53284043). The fix sanitises the resolved external href before it is passed to <a> or the custom slot: control characters and whitespace are stripped, leading view-source: prefixes are unwrapped, and any remaining script-capable scheme (per isScriptProtocol) causes the href to be replaced with an empty string.

Workarounds

Until you can upgrade, validate URLs at the source before binding them to <NuxtLink :to> / :href. For example, only accept paths that start with / (and not //), or run user-supplied URLs through new URL(value) and reject anything whose protocol is not in an allow-list (typically http: and https:).

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-934w-87qh-qr26
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53722
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/0103ce06fbbbdfa079a7f020ef8ce00121eac4a3
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/53284043dc21210a25d629d1cec67d3ae557ffd0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-934w-87qh-qr26

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Cross-site scripting via slot content in Nuxt's head components

GHSA-m3q2-p4fw-w38m

More information

Details

Impact

Nuxt's globally registered <NoScript> component (from @unhead/vue head components, re-exported by Nuxt) wrote its default-slot content to the innerHTML of the <noscript> head tag, bypassing the HTML escaping that {{ }} interpolation normally applies in Vue templates.

Applications that placed untrusted, attacker-controllable data inside a <NoScript> slot, for example:

<NoScript>{{ route.query.banner }}</NoScript>

would emit that value unescaped inside <noscript> in the server-rendered HTML. With scripting enabled, the HTML parser treats <noscript> content in <head> under the "in head noscript" insertion mode: any tag other than link, meta, noframes, or style implicitly closes <noscript> and is re-processed in the head. A payload such as <script>...</script> therefore escapes the element and executes in the document context.

Sibling head components (<Style>, <Title>) were not affected because they already routed slot text through the safe textContent path.

Affected versions

All currently supported versions of nuxt that ship the <NoScript> global component.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 (commit 4b054e9d) and backported to nuxt@3.21.7 (commit 7fea9fd6). The fix escapes <NoScript> slot content with escapeHtml from @vue/shared and writes it to textContent rather than innerHTML. Slot content is now rendered as text; intentional markup inside <NoScript> is no longer parsed as HTML.

Workarounds

Until you can upgrade:

• Do not interpolate untrusted input into <NoScript> slots. Replace <NoScript>{{ x }}</NoScript> with a static string, or sanitise / HTML-escape x at the source.
• If you must render dynamic noscript content, write the tag yourself via useHead({ noscript: [{ textContent: escapedValue }] }) after escaping escapedValue.

Credit

Reported to Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure pipeline by Claude (Anthropic's AI assistant) and triaged by the Anthropic security team. Reference: ANT-2026-4NJYDFFM.

Independently reported by @​alcls01111 via GitHub's coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-8grp-wcq9-925q), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-m3q2-p4fw-w38m
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/4b054e9d95f8daf366cb144b52782047c511a66e
• https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/7fea9fd687f1dacbfb63db5fae5839896b017a0e
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3q2-p4fw-w38m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nuxt/nuxt (nuxt)

v4.4.7

Compare Source

4.4.7 is a security hotfix release.

👉 make sure to check https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories to view open advisories resolved by this release.

👉 Changelog

compare changes

🩹 Fixes

• nitro: Assign noSSR before deciding payload extraction (#​35108)
• vite: Avoid filtering out dirs with shared prefix from allowDirs (#​35112)
• nuxt: Use resolve from pathe for buildCache path boundary check (#​35111)
• nuxt: Prevent sibling-directory traversal in test component wrapper (#​35110)
• nitro: Pass event data to isValid in dev clipboard-copy listener (#​35109)
• nuxt: Validate protocols in reloadNuxtApp path before reload (#​35115)
• vite: Prefix public asset virtuals with null byte (9e303b438)
• nuxt: Re-run getCachedData after initial fetch (#​35122)
• nuxt: Propagate useFetch/useAsyncData factory types (#​35133)
• vite: Close vite dev server on nuxt close (a10a68abc)
• kit,nuxt: Handle cancelling prompts to install packages (e84813229)
• kit: Avoid excluding node-context files in legacy tsconfig (#​35152)
• nuxt: Handle missing payload in chunkError listener (#​35155)
• nuxt: Await in-lifght template generation when closing nuxt (#​35181)
• nuxt: Clarify page and layout usage warnings (#​35184)
• webpack: Surface compilation errors when stats.toString is empty (073b07851)
• nuxt: Reject prototype-chain keys in the island registry (#​35205)
• nuxt: Apply isScriptProtocol guard to navigateTo open option (#​35206)
• nuxt: Prevent server-only page island from recursing via <NuxtPage> (#​35198)
• rspack,webpack: Require loopback host when missing same-origin signals (#​35200)
• nitro: Gate chrome devtools workspace endpoint to local requests (#​35201)
• nuxt: Escape props in <NuxtClientFallback> ssr output (#​35199)
• kit: Improve TS extension stripping/substitutions (#​35233)
• nuxt: Preserve .d.mts/.d.cts in resolveTypePaths (#​35235)
• nuxt: Escape <NoScript> slot content (4b054e9d9)
• nuxt: Match route rules case-insensitively to mirror vue-router (07e39cd6f)
• nuxt: Reject script-capable protocols in <NuxtLink> href (0103ce06f)
• nuxt: Block path-normalization open redirect in navigateTo (2cce6fb02)
• nuxt: Reject cross-origin paths in reloadNuxtApp (e447a793c)
• vite: Bind vite-node IPC to a permissioned filesystem socket (1f9f4767a)

💅 Refactors

• kit,nuxt,vite: Use es2023 array methods (#​34980)
• nuxt: Replace runInNewContext with AST walker (d72a89ef4)

📖 Documentation

• Document vite client and server options (#​35090)
• Add dedicated module dependencies page (#​35171)
• Add nodeTsConfig and sharedTsConfig options (#​35231)
• Edit for clarity and grammar (#​35214)

🏡 Chore

• Use execFileSync for safety in release scripts (1d7baaf01)
• Assert there is always a tag (e98c47c3c)
• Add autofix action tag in comment (ffa5c0098)
• Fix type in test (a549652e2)
• Update renovate minimum release age (d12d5e58a)
• Fix lychee dynamic composable exclude (#​35119)
• Update lockfile (91186dc51)
• Lint (dbc58965c)

✅ Tests

• Update test for js payload rendering (bdcb81536)
• Cover add regression test for hmr in sibling local layers (#​35125)
• Improve reliability of hmr test (1d709b3cc)

🤖 CI

• Always run all tests for 4.x/3.x (0dc4665cf)
• Migrate from tibdex (ded29dc0f)
• Add zizmor github actions check (#​35089)
• Update to agentscan v1.8.0 (#​35120)
• Automatically close PRs from automated accounts (#​35161)
• Disable provenance-change enforcement in dependency-review (a2cf43e68)

❤️ Contributors

• Daniel Roe (@​danielroe)
• David Stack (@​davidstackio)
• David De Sloovere (@​DavidDeSloovere)
• anton-gor-dev (@​anton-gor-dev)
• Noah3521 (@​Noah3521)
• Shahar Aviram (@​ShaharAviram1)
• Matej Černý (@​cernymatej)
• Mohit Kumar (@​mohitkum4r)
• Matteo Gabriele (@​MatteoGabriele)
• Julien Huang (@​huang-julien)
• Damian Głowala (@​DamianGlowala)

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The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
scripts-playground	Ready	Preview, Comment	Jun 16, 2026 8:52pm

[socket-security]

Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff	Package	Supply Chain Security	Vulnerability	Quality	Maintenance	License
	nuxt@​4.4.8 ⏵ 4.4.7
	@​nuxt/​kit@​4.4.8 ⏵ 4.4.7				+2

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[pkg-pr-new]

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npm i https://pkg.pr.new/@nuxt/scripts@816

commit: 8aae7b2