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security: validate API host authorities - #12

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cr-shah merged 3 commits into
codex/security-auth-brute-forcefrom
codex/security-trusted-hosts
Oct 25, 2026
Merged

cr-shah merged 3 commits into
codex/security-auth-brute-forcefrom
codex/security-trusted-hosts

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@cr-shah cr-shah commented Oct 25, 2026

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Reject spoofed or malformed Host headers before API routes run. Hosted services require an explicit TRUSTED_HOSTS allowlist; local mode permits localhost, loopback, and TestClient. Missing hosted configuration returns 503 rather than silently trusting any host.

Handles duplicate headers, DNS syntax, IPv6, ports, and wildcard subdomains. The Render Blueprint requests the actual service hostname instead of guessing it. Set TRUSTED_HOSTS before deployment, including the hostname used by health checks.

Verification: 181 pytest tests passed; Ruff check and formatting passed. Fresh review found malformed DNS edge cases, now covered and fixed.

Depends on #11 (which depends on #10). One commit relative to its base. Merge the prerequisites into main first, then retarget this PR to main; use merge commits to preserve ancestry across this stack.

security: verify model artifacts before deserialization
@cr-shah
cr-shah merged commit aa85b1d into codex/security-auth-brute-force Oct 25, 2026
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